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
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
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UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS IN
THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN

by

Michael F. Cordasco, Jr.

June 1982

Thesis Advisor:

M. W. Clough

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United States Policy Options in the
Western Indian Ocean

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., Texas A&M University, 1970

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines United States interests in the Western Indian Ocean and recommends a policy toward the area. It analyzes the economic and regional importance of the main states in the area: Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, The Comoros, and The Seychelles. Particular attention is given to strategic, economic and political considerations. United States policy objectives and options in the area are broadly explored and recommendations are made for a policy that is affirmative rather than reactive in approach to the area and its problems. This approach should not target a specific country but rather must look at the area in a regional and global perspective.

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I. INTRODUCTION

East of Africa and south of Asia lies the third largest sea in the world the Indian Ocean (IO), covering more than twenty-eight million square miles. The Indian Ocean is possibly the least known of the world's major oceans although its waters wash the shores of some thirty-five independent nations. One important fact distinguishing the Indian Ocean from its sister oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific, is the absence of a major world power along its shores. For this reason it is often regarded as an area of secondary importance to these major powers. The focus of this study is on a small segment of the Indian Ocean, that area called, for want of a better term, the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) whose geographical limits have arbitrarily been constructed as extending from approximately 20° S latitude northward to 5° S latitude and from the East African coast to 75° E longitude and encompassing primarily the littoral nations of Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius, The Comoros and The Seychelles.

It has only been since the 1960s that the Department of Defense began to look in earnest at the strategic possibilities of the WIO. Previously the islands of the WIO seemed to be living safely in a distant corner of the world away from super-power confrontation. Despite all of the turmoil and conflict taking place in the 20th century the Indian Ocean remained

basically unaffected up until the late 1960s. The British decision to withdraw its military forces from the area in 1968 combined with reduced French military presence and economic austerity programs in the area and the rapid withdrawal of Portuguese forces in 1974 resulted in a power vacuum in the area. Into this new arena rushed the superpowers of the 1970s: the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Economic factors were partly responsible but by 1975 a race was in progress between the strategists of the United States and the Soviet Union to lay claim to the WIO. The Nixon Administration brought the issue of protection of sealanes into the spotlight and the Indian Ocean became a prime candidate for an area of superpower confrontation. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War emphasized the value of permanent operating bases in the Indian Ocean, the unreliability of operating from bases in Arab nations, and the sensitivity of the West about the supply and protection of shipments of natural resources. [Ref. 1] The WIO's strategic importance for the superpowers is often linked to its position astride the vital Cape Route and the utilization of that route by global transport.

The fact that the Western industrial nations are dependent on overseas sources of energy and raw materials has been brought home to most of the inhabitants of the West and increasing attention has been focused on the routes by which these commodities reach their destinations. It has become clear that any serious interruption in the flow of these goods

would cause severe economic and in turn political damage to these nations.

Although the threat to U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean is of a relatively low magnitude, it is nevertheless an area that deserves close and continuing attention in view of the apparent Soviet objective to enlarge their influence and presence in the region. [Ref. 2]

The purpose of this study is to examine the area of the Western Indian Ocean from strategic, economic and political points of view in order to determine what U.S. interests in the area are and assess our ability to protect those interests.

This thesis is divided into three primary sections. Section one attempts to delineate the United State's interests in the Western Indian Ocean. It examines both strategic and economic considerations. Section two provides a country-by-country survey of the political evolution of the region. Finally, section three attempts to define U.S. policy objectives for the region and outline the options available for achieving those objectives. The position taken in this section is that the U.S. needs to develop a coherent policy toward the Western Indian Ocean as a region. This policy should be an affirmative rather than a reactive approach to the area and its problems. This approach should not single out a specific country but rather must look at the area in a regional and global perspective.

II. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN

A. THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN

The vastness of the IO is shown by the long distances between points around its shores. [Ref. 3] From Capetown to Singapore, for example, the distance is 5,579 nautical miles; from Aden to Australia it is 5,187 nautical miles. A number of islands are situated along these extended routes. Two-thirds of the way from Capetown to Singapore lies the island of Mauritius. Mauritius also is conveniently situated along the routes from Capetown to Colombo and Bombay. [Ref. 4] The Comoros are strategically located astride the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel while the Seychelles sit along one of the main inter-ocean routes to Colombo and Singapore as well as one of the inter-ocean routes to Dar Es Salaam. The island nation of Madagascar comprises the eastern breakwater of the strategic Mozambique Channel.

Most of the islands of the WIO are clustered in a wide arc to the east and northeast of Madagascar. [Ref. 5] The islands of the IO have developed in a variety of ways. Madagascar and part of the Seychelles are granitic islands, detached from larger land masses. Mauritius and the Comoros are volcanic islands formed from submarine eruptions. Another type, including the islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) developed from the buildup of coral in shallow tropical waters. [Ref. 6.]

Throughout history the islands of the WIO have figured primarily as counters for the interplay of great-power imperialism. Their subordination to Europe and disengagement from Afro-Asia proceeded at different times and with differing consequences. The fact that these islands are important today. is not directly linked to any actions by the island's governments but rather to the strategies of the superpowers in the WIO. Today U.S. and Soviet vessels can be found in increasing numbers in the IO for many different reasons (i.e. show the flag, fishing, commerce, fleet transfers, etc.). Additionally, Chinese vessels are frequent visitors to Dar Es Salaam. England and France are also seeking a return to the area with increased military presence and West Germany has decided to follow along although in a somewhat lesser capacity due to arms limitations. No longer stepping-stones in an empire, the Comoros, Madagascar, Seychelles and Mauritius have strategic importance as nations in an increasingly disputed area of ocean. [Ref. 7]

Also important in the region, however - and critical to its development - are the airfields. These not only permit access to and from the outside world, but also are often the only feasible mode of travel. Large airfields capable of handling modern jets, and with ample refueling facilities, exist in many countries in the region and there are numerous smaller fields. Mainly constructed during the European-dominated colonial era, these air facilities play a vital

security role as well as important economic and political roles. The strategic value of such African air bases, together with over-flight, staging or basing rights in African countries, has been demonstrated by both Western powers and the Soviet Union seeking to shore up shaky client regimes.

[Ref. 8]

1. Madagascar

The Democratic Republic of Madagascar (formerly called the Malagasy Republic) comprises the island of Madagascar and several much smaller islands nearby - Nosy Be, Nosy Mitsio, Ile St. Marie and Iles Barren. Madagascar is the fourth largest island in the world with 5,000 kilometers of shore-line, and is separated from the African mainland by the Mozambique Channel with a nominal width of some 400 km. It is 1,600 km long from north to south and its width varies between 450 and 570 km. The whole country covers an area of 587,041 sq km and had an estimated population of 9,112,000 in 1977. Geologically the island is composed of crystalline rock. Due to its location Madagascar has remained isolated from most of the world.

Madagascar's mountainous topography has been a continuous handicap but the great natural harbor of Antseranana (formerly Diego - Suarez an important French naval base) is located in the northern province isolated by the island's highest peak. Although lacking sheltered anchorages on the eastern coast Toamasina (Tamatave) is the site of Madagascar's

most important commercial port. There are few good natural harbors in the IO, but Baie de Narinda on the west coast and Diego Suarez in the north are among the largest and best natural harbors in the world. Unfortunately Baie de Narinda is isolated from the country's principal commercial centers and is still undeveloped while Baie de Diego Suarez was developed by the French as a naval base. There are 18 ports with Toamasina handling about two-thirds of the total traffic while the second largest, Mahajanga, is on the west coast. Because of the high cost of maintaining rail and road networks much money and effort is being spent on expanding Madagascar's air services. Madagascar already has over 200 airfields (2/3 of which are privately held) and three airports can accommodate large jet aircraft. The international airport Ivato is located at the capital Antananarivo and is served by Aeroflot, Air France, Alitalia and Air Tanzania.

Madagascar claims the small offshore islands - Bassas de India, Europa, Juan de Nova to the west, and Glorieuses and Tromelin to the east. All of these islands with the exception of Bassas de India possess a weather station and an airstrip. The weather stations are manned by the French who consider the islands French overseas territories in the IO and administer them out of Reunion.

2. Mozambique

Mozambique covers an area of 783,030 sq km of African territory with an estimated population of 11,750,000

in 1979. Its neighbors are, to the north, Tanzania, to the west Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and to the south South Africa and Swaziland. Its shoreline is 2,735 km long and generally sandy and bordered by lagoons, shoals and strings of coastal islets in the north. At least 25 main rivers cut through Mozambique and flow into the IO.

Mozambique's location on the eastern flank of southern Africa gives to her a position of unique importance. Of all Africa's "outlet" countries, she is the most strategically placed: because of her coastline, the quantity and size of her harbours, and the number of countries whose outlets to the sea she controls. Mozambique is the natural maritime outlet for Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, parts of South Africa and Swaziland. Mozambique's harbours, which are of excellent quality have been greatly enhanced in importance because of the inland territories they serve; for some of these territories they are the only ports that make economic sense. Railways from these inland countries pass through Mozambique on their way to its ports and are vital links in the transportation network for southern Africa.

Mozambique's main ports are Maputo (the second largest port in Africa, with the annex at Matola), Beira, Nacala and Quelimane. Maputo is considered the best harbor on the whole East African coast and serves as the principal outlet for Swaziland, the Transvaal and Zimbabwe. Twenty-one vessels can be berthed at any one time and it has special facilities

for loading coal, a cold storage plant for fruit and a sugar terminal. Beira is the outlet for Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe as well as some traffic from Zaire. The most recently developed port has been Nacala which possesses a large natural harbor while the railway inland from it serves the northern interior of Mozambique and Malawi. It will become one of major ports of East Africa. [Ref. 9]

Air transportation is operated by the state and there are 16 airports, three of which are international. Mozambique is served by Aeroflot, Air Tanzania, Interflug (G.D.R.), Zambia Airways and TAAG (Angola) among others.

Mozambique's geographic location in southern Africa, bordering as it does on South Africa, also makes it a very important political actor in southern Africa. Since its independence in 1975, it has been a critical member of the Front-line States grouping. This is discussed later in greater detail.

3. The Comoros

Situated like stepping stones the Comoro Islands, an archipelago of four small islands, together with numerous islets and coral reefs, lie between the east African coast and Madagascar. The four islands have a total land area of only 2,236 sq km and are scattered along a N.W.-S.E. axis, 300 km separating the towns of Moroni in the west and Dzaoudzi in the east. The French names for the islands, Grande-Comore

(on which the capital, Moroni, is situated). Anjouan, Moheli and Mayotte were changed in May 1977 to Njazidja, Nzwani, Mwali and Mahore respectively, although the former names are still widely used.

The composition of the population (estimated at 385,000 in 1978, including Mayotte) is complex as the islands were invaded by many ethnically different groups. The different sections of the population are still not fully integrated, but Arab culture is found throughout the Archipelago. French was the official language until independence in 1975 at which time the new state returned to Arabic. The majority of the population, however, speak Comorian, a mixture of Arabic and Swahili which is written in Arabic script. [Ref. 10] The transport infrastructure of the Comoros consists of approximately 750 km of roads serviceable throughout the year: four ports, only two of which can accommodate medium size vessels; and an airport on each island. Grand Comores airport at Moroni (the capital) was improved to handle large jets in 1973. Most of the imports from Europe come via Madagascar and coasters serve the islands from the east coast to Africa.

4. Mauritius

Lying some 804 km east of Madagascar is Mauritius an island of 1,865 sq km in area. It is volcanic and almost completely surrounded by a coral reef. Including other islands, mainly Rodrigues, the whole country has an area of 2,040 sq km and a population of 911,507 (1979 estimate).

Mauritius is well served by numerous foreign shipping lines and modernization of the harbor at Port Louis was completed in 1980. In 1974, 1,217 ships visited Port Louis compared with 700 a year before the Suez Canal closed in 1967. Although the Suez Canal reopened in 1975, the growth in tourism has stimulated both sea and air travel to Mauritius. In 1979, 2,816 aircraft landed, depositing 179,190 passengers. The airport is at Plaisance although the government is building a new international airport at Plaines des Roches in the north of the island with assistance from the People's Republic of China.

Rodrigues, a volcanic island of 104 sq km surrounded by a coral reef, 585 km east of Mauritius (19°S., 63°E), is an integral part of the state of Mauritius. Its population in 1979 was estimated at 29,203.

Mauritius has two dependencies (together covering 71 sq. km and having 367 inhabitants in 1972): Agalega, two islands 935 km north of Mauritius (10°S., 56°E); and St. Brandon (or Cargados Carajos Shoals), 22 islets without permanent inhabitants but used as fishing stations, 370 km north-northeast of Mauritius (16° S., 59° E).

Mauritius claims sovereignty over Tromlin, a small island without permanent inhabitants, 556 km to the northwest. This claim is disputed by France (France has maintained an airstrip and weather stations on this island since 1959). Mauritius also seeks the return of Diego Garcia, a coral

atoll in the Chagos Archipelago, about 1,900 km to the north-east. The Archipelago was formerly administered by Mauritius but in 1965 became part (and in 1976) all of the British Indian Ocean territory.

Mauritius lies on the principal shipping lane between Europe and the Far East for traffic not utilizing the Suez Canal. Port Louis has the largest ship repair facility on any of the small Indian Ocean islands. [Ref. 11]

Petroleum exploration is now underway north of Mauritius and there is a possibility of bringing in wells on the Cargados Carajos Shoals; if exploitable petroleum reserves should be proved, the importance of the outlying islands would increase dramatically. [Ref. 12]

5. The Seychelles

The Seychelles archipelago consists of a scattered group of 37 granitic and 52 coralline islands along with numerous rocks and small cays. When independence was achieved in June 1976 the Aldabra Islands, the Farquhar group and the Desroches (combined area 28.5 sq km), part of the British Indian Ocean Territory since 1965, were reunited with the Seychelles, thus restoring the land area to 308 sq km. Including the Aldabra lagoon, the country's area is 444 sq km.

The largest of the islands is Mahe, which has an area of about 148 sq km and is approximately 27 km long. Mahe lies 1,800 km due east of Mombasa (Kenya), 3,300 km southwest of Bombay, and 1,100 km north of Madagascar. Victoria,

(formerly Port Victoria), the capital of the Seychelles and the only port in the archipelago, is on Mahe and is the only town in Seychelles of any size with an estimated population of 23,000 in 1977. The population in 1980 was 65,000 and the bulk of them reside on Mahe. [Ref. 13]

The strategic location of the islands was recognized by the British and in 1965 Desroches and the Aldabra and Farquhar islands were originally included in the BIOT because of their potential as military bases. The British planned to build an air staging area on Aldabra in 1967; the island has ample room for a 3,600 meter runway, and anchorage is available in the main channel leading to the lagoon. Desroches and the Farquhars also have some potential for military basing. Desroches' deep lagoon is accessible by a milewide channel exceeding 25 meters in depth. In the Farquhars, South Island offers possibilities for the construction of a runway. [Ref. 14.]

The geographic value of the Seychelles is recognized by the U.S. which operates a satellite tracking station in Mahe. The Seychelles is sometimes referred to as the "strategic territory at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean." In 1978, 386 vessels entered Mahe and in 1979 2,677 international aircraft arrived bringing 78,900 visitors.

B. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Oceanborne commerce has flourished in the Indian Ocean since the earliest times. The ancient Arabs were the pioneers of navigation and utilized the wind effect of the monsoon to conduct trade between the Persian Gulf (PG), eastern Africa and India. Gradually expanding their sea routes, the Arabs extended their trade to the coast of China and islands of Southeast Asia. The subsequent trade in spices and silk provided the incentive for medieval European merchants to seek a route to the Indies. This hastened the voyages of discoveries and culminated in the 1498 rounding of the Cape of Good Hope by the Portuguese seafarer, Vasco Da Gama. This set off a rash of expeditions by the Portuguese, French, English and Dutch explorers. Foremost among these were those financed by the British and Dutch East India Companies who carved out trading zones throughout the area. Coinciding with the era of the steamship was the opening of the Suez Canal which significantly reduced the travel time between Europe and the Orient. Ships were now independent of the seasonal wind and required only the availability of coaling stations. Coal was soon to give way in the face of technology to oil. The emergence of oil as a major energy source caused the shifting of trade patterns as interest began to concentrate on the major oil producing area - the Persian Gulf. The closure of the Suez Canal from 1967-1975 once again forced oceanborne commerce between Europe and the PG/Orient to revert to the longer

and more expensive Cape Route. The closing of the Suez Canal hastened the development of much larger tankers in order to provide monetary compensation for the longer voyage by reducing the cost per unit of goods transported.

The strategic importance of the Western Indian Ocean to the superpowers derives from the potential control of strategic points within it and with the larger issue of sea lines of communication across the IO. These matters involve interplay between naval strategies, land-based policies, the quest for bases (or "facilities"), and general questions of armaments on and under the IO. [Ref. 15]

The superpowers are competing against one another for access and influence in the IO. This concern for influence is related in large part to the ability of the individual superpower to operate effectively in the area. While there are numerous similarities in the desires of each superpower each seeks to prevent the other from establishing a privileged position vis-a-vis key chokepoints or other strategic positions. [Ref. 16]

Prior to 1974, the focus of strategic rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Africa was in the area of the Horn of Africa. This was due in large part to its closeness to the Middle East and the vital oil fields of the Persian Gulf. In the Horn of Africa, the previous age of Western domination symbolized by a strong pro-Western Ethiopia was thrown into chaos by the Ethiopian revolution and the postindependence

conflict with Somalia. This area provided the arena for superpower competition which has continued to expand into other areas of the continent.

In southern Africa we have seen the rise of successful movements for liberation in Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe as well as independence movements in the Seychelles, Comoros and Mauritius.

While it cannot be denied that the Horn of Africa is important some observers argue that the control of the southern tip of the African continent (the Cape Route) is another point of geopolitical importance, because much of the oil shipped to Western Europe and America goes around the Cape. [Ref. 17] Sub-Saharan Africa has become a region of increasing strategic importance to the U.S., primarily because of its geographic position vis-a-vis two critical theaters, the North Atlantic and the Middle East - Persian Gulf. [Ref. 18]

Broad changes are occurring in the world's strategic environment which are causing us to focus on the importance of Africa. Particularly significant are the changing patterns of Western and Soviet basing rights throughout the world, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, and the new laws of the sea which are drastically altering the map of the world's oceans, seaways, and choke points. [Ref. 19] The impact of this has dramatized the role of the southern seas and the Cape Route. The IO is important to the Soviet Union for a number of reasons. It provides a sea route to the eastern part of

the country which is of particular importance in the aspect of a Sino-Soviet conflict. Additionally the Soviets need to monitor the Western shipping in the area. Since the loss of Berbera, the Soviet Union has no base in the western IO capable of providing the support available to the U.S. from Diego Garcia. In view of developments along the IO littoral, increased Soviet presence in the area, and rising fear about the safe navigation of oil vessels from the PG the U.S. response in the area has increased. U.S. naval activity in the IO increased in 1978-79 and the continuous development of Diego Garcia is a definite indication that the U.S. intends to remain in the IO. It is obvious that each superpower is concerned with the actions of the other in the IO. Although the current level of competition is not as intense in the IO as it is in other strategic areas it is apparent that both powers perceive that they have important interests in the western Indian Ocean. Each superpower must view the area in a regional and global aspect. Inevitably as issues such as the freedom of navigation, access to strategic minerals, and control of strategic territory increase in importance so will the superpower commitment in the area. [Ref. 20]

1. Cape Route

The Cape Route is a vital commercial link for the transportation of raw materials (including oil) and as a route for deploying naval forces into the Indian Ocean. While the Suez Canals was closed, 24,000 ships were rounding the Cape

each year; the figure now stands at some 16,000, including an ever-increasing number of super tankers that cannot pass through the canal. [Ref. 21] The closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 gave new impetus to the Cape Route. The Cape Route is one of the world's prime strategic sea lines of communication (SLOC) essentially because of the development of super-tankers which, originating in the PG and travelling around the Cape, can deliver oil to Western ports at a price below that of smaller vessels transiting through the Suez Canal. Many other commodities, such as Zambian and Zairian copper and South African manganese, are also sent normally by way of the Cape Route. [Ref. 22]

The importance of the Cape Route stems not only from its posture as a funnel for Middle East oil but conservative estimates suggest that fully 70 per cent of the strategic raw materials needed by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ply the waters around Africa. [Ref. 23]

Within sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Africa's strategic importance is second only to that of the Horn of Africa. The region's extensive coastline - extending from Angola south to the Cape and north again to Tanzania can provide valuable air and naval bases for operations in the southeastern Atlantic, the Cape area, and the southwestern IO. [Ref. 24] Mozambique, one of the larger states of the region, has a coastline of over 1500 miles and three major ports.

While we often hear absurd statements attempting to reduce the significance of the Cape Route it is best that we remember some of our more recent naval history. During the Vietnam War it frequently became necessary to transfer destroyers based on the United States east coast to Southeast Asia. In order to facilitate their transfer, the U.S. had to make heavy use of Luanda (Angola) and Lourenco Marques (now known as Maputo in Mozambique). The 2800-mile distance between the two Portuguese ports left destroyers dangerously low on fuel between them; and the program of refueling added a number of days to the voyage. The reopening of the Suez Canal has alleviated this problem but what if the Canal were again closed? [Ref. 25] Can the U.S. depend on any port facilities along the eastern seaboard of Africa? Are their other anchorages up the East African coast or in the islands of the WIO that would be acceptable substitutes?

Whenever one is analyzing the strategic importance of commercial aspects of the Cape Route you must be sure to include both wartime scenarios when alternatives could be found and more complicated crisis scenarios when the economic costs of not using the Cape Route would, themselves, create serious economic problems not only for members of the Western alliance but for many countries in the Third world. [Ref. 26]

As a point of entry into the Indian Ocean from the South Atlantic and the reverse the Cape Route is of definite military interest. In the event of a crisis in an area, it

is necessary for the U.S. fleets to be able to transfer elements from the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets to the crisis area. Due to the distances involved and the necessity to refuel oil burning vessels bunkering facilities are a must. These facilities can be arranged in a number of ways: foreign facilities, underway replenishment of the fleet in transit, or U.S. bases. While the most convenient option would be to utilize foreign facilities it must be remembered that during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war effective pressure was exerted against suppliers not to provision the U.S. Navy and if African facilities are denied to the fleet it would not be possible to deploy into the IO without the extensive use of naval combat support ships. However, once the fleet is on station the problem begins to arise or how to replenish the support vessels. While mathematically it is possible to overcome this difficulty if enough tankers are available the costs go up drastically if fuel is not available locally. [Ref. 27]

According to the Maritime Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce in its publication, United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, the routes designated TR 51 and TR 52 which provide services to South and East Africa via the Cape are designated as essential trade routes. These trade routes include ports in the Seychelles (Victoria), Mauritius (Port Louis), Mozambique, Madagascar and the Comoro Islands. They originate on the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts. [Ref. 28]

2. The Mozambique Channel

Maritime passage and choke points must be viewed today in a different context than they were years ago. No longer does the historically held concept of choke points as applying only to narrow waterways that control key exit and entrance points for seaborne traffic hold true but in fact due to technology and other advances this concept must be broadened to include other areas not normally considered as choke points by the layman (such as the Mozambique Channel). As modern naval technology advances and comes increasingly within the reach of littoral states, and as shipping becomes vulnerable to harassment or interference in a variety of new ways, the width of choke points increase. [Ref. 29] Indeed it has even been suggested by Geoffrey Kemp that eventually entire oceans could conceivably be considered potential choke points.

The Mozambique Channel is approximately one thousand miles long and is created by the island of Madagascar which serves as a giant breakwater off the coast of Mozambique, from which it is separated by the 250 to 500 mile (400-800 km) channel. [Ref. 30]

It is obvious that naval and air bases at or in the vicinity of the channel would assist in guaranteeing access to the area and in insuring the free passage of a country's vessels through the channel or the denial of the right of passage to an adversary.

Almost all of the Cape traffic from the PG passes through the Mozambique Channel. If a hostile force was to gain positions either along the coast of Mozambique or on Madagascar proper it would be in an excellent position to threaten shipping through the channel. Until recently the African coastline facing the Channel, primarily Mozambique, was under pro-Western control - the Portuguese. Not only has this situation changed with the independence of Mozambique in 1975 but there is no guarantee that Madagascar will remain friendly to Western interests if indeed its actions are now considered pro-Western.

Shorebased intervention by anti-Western revolutionary movements of oceanborne commerce, particularly tanker traffic, is a very real possibility and we must take a close look at the stability and governments of nations along the tanker routes. One of the unpleasant facts of life today is that money appears to be distributed with the utmost irresponsibility to almost any movement that claims it is seeking to strike a blow against society. Terrorism has become an attractive, adventurous way of life, and the new weapons, such as the SA-7 heat-seeking missiles and remote-controlled bombs and mines, have reduced the danger of detection and arrest greatly. Thus, subversive factions in a country can often get without difficulty all the money, weapons and trained operators they require to support their arguments. [Ref. 31] The precedent for this type of action was set on 14 June 1971 when a

Liberian tanker was attacked by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) with a bazooka in the Red Sea for trading with their enemy - Israel.

There are various threats to shipping and these run the full spectrum from organized efforts by governments to terrorist attacks by individuals. An oil tanker is extremely vulnerable to attack by a small combatant craft or to aircraft. While the current threat to sea lines of communication along the Cape Route are not of grave proportions there is the distinct possibility that the threat could become significant in the future. A scenario could easily be built upon the premise that some of the countries along the route were to obtain small, high speed, missile-equipped surface craft of the Komar or Osa-class. The potential threat from these craft could not be totally ignored. A threat of this type would be particularly troublesome in confined waters, such as those of the Mozambique Channel. The threat from aircraft operating out of nearby airfields is also very real. The union of precision-guided missiles to small surface craft and aircraft has effected a revolution in certain aspects of naval warfare. One need only to think back to the destruction of the Israeli destroyer ELLAT in 1967 or to the more recent destruction of the British destroyer SHEFFIELD for example. As precision-guided weapons have increased in number and use, the threat from such weapons has not only expanded but has become more believable. The possibilities for the use of these weapons

are almost infinite and it appears that the possibility exists for the Cape Route to be interdicted at numerous points by hostile governments or individuals. [Ref. 3]]

C. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE

The basic economic facts are fairly straightforward and there is no overwhelming need for elaboration for it should suffice to say that in terms of overall U.S. trade and investment, Africa is one of the least important continents and the islands of the Western Indian Ocean are even further down on the list. [Ref. 33] However, if we break down the data we can find that certain African countries do possess economic significance particularly South Africa and Zaire and their economic significance is primarily concentrated in the private interests of U.S. companies. The U.S. economic interest in the area is derived primarily from the area's importance to Europe and Japan.

Prior to independence for the countries that are the subject of this study the governing Western powers monopolized the administration and concentrated on the exploitation of whatever natural resources were available and continued European access to them. All of these countries were treated as if they were an extension of Europe and little was done to develop the colony/country.

In economic jargon all of these countries are less-developed countries (LDC's) and are part of one of the poorest regions of the world.

The typical economic structure of one of these countries consists of a large agricultural sector comprising most of the labour force and a very small modern sector which is dependent on the export of one or two primary products left over from colonial days. They share the same common problem similar to other developing nations - urbanization with its resulting unemployment, and increased population growth. They are among the world's least developed nations.

Trade and investment figures for southern Africa although large in figures are relatively small when compared to the United States global activities in the economic realm. Even the so-called crucial raw materials which came from southern Africa are relatively few in number. In southern Africa and the Western IO none of these economic factors should play a large role in determining U.S. policy.

We cannot say that economic considerations have no role to play in this area only that U.S. policy is not clearly motivated by economic interests. In the long run the U.S. has an economic interest in African economic growth, trade liberalization, and price stability. Although the global impact of these conditions in Africa is relatively small, they do contribute to the strength and stability of the international economic system and therefore are ultimately of benefit to the U.S. Also of importance is the African role in the North-South dialogue concerning the new international economic order.

[Ref. 34]

The principal trading partners of the Western IO are in Western Europe although Europe's portion of African exports has been reduced in light of Japanese and U.S. inroads into the area. Investment links with the former colonial powers are usually more important than those with the U.S.

1. Madagascar

Madagascar suffers from isolation and remoteness even while lying on the world supertanker routes and possessing the IO's finest natural harbor. Subsistence farming occupies about 85% of the population with rice as the basic food crop and cattle raising an important side line. Madagascar's economic development has been made more difficult by the country's terrain and its isolation from external markets. These factors when added to the poor internal communications, shortage of skilled labor, frequently adverse climate (cyclones), the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, and the inability of the economy to keep up with the population growth not to mention the outbreaks of violence, political instability and rising inflation do not paint a very bright economic picture.

a. Agricultural

Agriculture continues to be the backbone of Madagascar's economy accounting for about two-thirds of its revenue and one-half its G.N.P. A large variety of crops are grown with 12 providing the rural population with much of their food and about 90% of the country's export. The principal export crops are coffee, vanilla, sugar, cloves and clove oil.

Madagascar has long failed to achieve its agricultural potential. The output of food crops and export crops over the past few years has been stagnant or declining. Once an exporter of rice the country now finds itself in the position of having to import it. To reduce imports the government is trying to make the population at least feed itself and in order to achieve this they have been concentrating on increasing production, improving transportation and combatting those who are against Madagascar's socialist revolution.

Official measures to win the "battle for rice" include a state company (SINPA) to collect the rice for milling and marketing (1973), raising the price paid to producers (1974), issuing ration cards for rice and controlling its sale and price to consumers (1975) as well as inducing Malagasys to replace rice by wheat in their diets, (1976) creating more farmers' co-operative societies (1977), improving irrigation (1978), decreasing consumption by instituting one riceless day a week and increasing the area planted. The effectiveness of these measures has run the full gambit from none to relative success and is best demonstrated by the fact that Madagascar's rice imports now account for three quarters of the country's trade deficit.

Coffee cultivation which concerns about one quarter of the population has remained fairly stable over the years but unfortunately the prices have been dropping. Madagascar's vanilla and clove exports have also declined slightly in the past few years.

Madagascar's territorial waters were extended in 1973 when it claimed the borders of its continental shelf out to 180 km but by 1980 it had only four fishing companies engaged in limited enterprise but sea fishing is gradually being industrialized with Japanese help.

Animal husbandry is also an area that could help remedy the country's protein deficiency and where the government has been attempting to industrialize the abundant resources. It is ironic that in a country where the number of cattle exceeds that of humans that the average Malagasy can only afford to eat meat three or four times per month. Beef is exported and could become a much more important part of the export market if properly organized and managed.

In general, Madagascar's agricultural potential is great and it possesses an unusually diversified production pattern but development - in the form of transportation facilities, irrigation networks, storage facilities, and essential machinery - came to late in the colonial era. Madagascar's problem of assembling capital from its wide agricultural base is due mainly to the lack of adequate colonial investment in the colonial period. Madagascar inherited a very poor infrastructure upon independence in 1960 and its economic difficulties cannot be attributed largely to any political causes since that date.

b. Industrial

Industry accounts for only about 15 per cent of Madagascar's GNP and employs very few of the economically active population (<1%) and is concerned primarily with processed food, textiles, paper, cement, refined petroleum products, paper and mining. In 1978, Madagascar only had some 200 industrial enterprises. Since then the government has encouraged the expansion of existing plants making clothing paper, refined sugar as well as those mining ventures extracting mica, graphite and bauxite. Additionally, it has helped to create firms producing certain types of capital goods and those formed to mine uranium, iron and nickel. Initially, nationalization was restricted to key sectors of the economy such as banking, mining, transportation, foreign trade and any endeavor which was deemed to have strategic importance. Under the charter of state enterprise, state controlled industries are grouped according to their activities and are managed by committees composed of representatives of the workers, the government and participating private enterprise if any.

The most important industrial project is that of a ferrochrome processing plant to be built near the chromite deposits of Andriamena and to be powered by electricity from a hydroelectric station which is expected to begin operation in 1982 at Andekaleka. The rising cost of oil has given new life to the project of extracting and distilling oil from the

tar sands deposits of Bemalanga and coal deposits in Sakoa. A January 1980 announcement of oil and gas discoveries hopefully will signal the end of Madagascar's dependence on foreign fuel and could lead to Madagascar becoming an oil exporter "by 1985". This announcement should be treated with a great deal of suspicion. Tar sands are the more likely long term source for its domestic energy and if proper investments are made domestic tar sands could replace one third of the current oil imports by 1985.

The same general observations about the agricultural sector apply to the industrial and mining sectors. Serious exploration of Madagascar's mineral resources were only undertaken in 1972 and have been centered around graphite, mica and chromite.

c. Finance

Since Madagascar's withdrawal from the franc zone in 1973, the budget has been growing faster than its foreign trade, on which most of its revenues depend. Increasing food and oil imports, coupled with reduced exports, has resulted in a five-fold increase in Madagascar's external trade deficit. As a result of poor trade performance, the country's foreign exchange reserves have been drastically reduced falling to \$5 mn at the end of 1979 and recovering only to \$9.2 mn by May 1980. Since January 1980, Madagascar has been in arrears in respect to imports and services. [Ref. 35]

Madagascar receives large amounts of aid mostly from France, the EEC, Western Europe and international organizations. Since 1972, Madagascar has received financial aid from the Socialist countries in particular China which furnished loan credits and local projects. In 1978 the U.S. supplied \$1.9 mn in food aid and scholarships but no economic aid. At present the only U.S. bilateral aid is humanitarian assistance handled by private charitable organizations such as the Catholic Relief Services.

Madagascar has long suffered from a low level of production investment and its annual investment rates are among the poorest of any developing country. Since leaving the franc zone in 1973, Madagascar has found difficulty in offering long-term finance in foreign currency and this is essential for the realization of industrial projects. [Ref. 36]

Economic growth has been slowed by official policies which have discouraged the private economic sector but the government is now promoting investment (domestic and foreign) in order to raise production and restore economic growth and development.

d. Foreign Trade

France remains Madagascar's primary trade partner along with the EEC accounting for some 32 per cent of its imports (compared with 11% for the U.S.) and 26 per cent of its exports (compared with 15% for the U.S.). Madagascar's trade with Eastern Europe remains minimal and armaments are

the main commodity in that relationship. A new development in Madagascar's favor has been an increase in trade with mainland Africa.

DIRECTION OF TRADE, 1979 (%)

	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	
France	32	26	
USA	11	15	(vanilla & coffee)
W. Germany	9	-	
Iraq	7	-	
Japan	6	-	
Indonesia	-	13	(cloves)

EXTERNAL TRADE (Mg Fr bn)

Exports foB	87.21	83.83
Imports cif	<u>99.63</u>	<u>152.96</u>
Balance	-12.42	-69.13

2. Mozambique

The economy of Mozambique is also characterized by a large traditional subsistence and small farm agricultural sector with 88 per cent of the working population thus engaged providing 80% of the exports but only 25 per cent of the GNP. Mozambique, unlike Madagascar, due to its strategic coastal location in Africa serves as an outlet for the mineral rich countries of southern Africa and the service sector of the economy accounts for 65 per cent of the GNP primarily from transit trade facilities, labor for South African mines and tourism.

With independence in 1975, the FRELIMO government inherited a colonial economy in which agriculture had been developed to supply cheap raw materials to Portugal and there was a small domestic market for Portugal's products. In addition, the Portuguese left Mozambique an enormous debt and an economy that was geared to serving the interests of Portugal, South Africa, Rhodesia and the West. The economic policies pursued during the colonial effort neglected the domestic development in the rural African sector and in the area of mineral mining. Little was done to exploit mineral resources or to create a framework that would support a relatively self-sufficient economic system that was capable of integrating a growing population into the production process.

Compared to other African countries, Mozambique is in a relatively good position. It is underpopulated, possesses large amounts of unexplored/unexploited resources - agricultural and mineral, and has access to several key ocean ports. The Constitution of 1975 stated that the country's land and subsoil resources were the property of the state, which was to determine their development and use. In keeping with socialist ideology the state owned sector was to be the leading and driving factor in the economy and collective forms of enterprise were encouraged although personal property was recognized.

New priorities were given to agriculture and education as well as to a reduction on the country's dependence on

Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, and to the development of a system that would integrate the different areas of the country. In typical socialist fashion long-term development programs were drawn up but they were/are handicapped by a lack of statistical data on which to base an assessment of the economy, shortage of trained personnel, poor government institutions, lack of financial resources, and the fact that the government was preoccupied with political matters.

FRELIMO is dedicated to creating a socialist/communist economy with state control of production and distribution and its closer ties to capitalism should not be interpreted as a diminished commitment to socialism. The economy, as in the case of other sectors of activity in Mozambique, was placed in a straightjacket of Marxist ideology. The results have been disastrous in the agricultural and industrial sectors and Mozambique today remains one of the poorest countries in southern Africa with its per capita income lower than any other country in the subcontinent except Malawi and Zaire (about \$140 in 1978).

a. Agricultural

Agriculture which includes fishing and forestry is the basis for the economy and agricultural raw materials provided the base for most industrial activity with five crops - cotton, copra, cashew nuts, sugar and tea - constituting the bulk of the country's exports. Since independence there has been a serious decline in agricultural production which is

usually attributed to two factors: most of the white farmers have abandoned their lands and fled the country, and as collectivization has progressed yield per acre has declined. [Ref. 37]

The performance of crops is particularly hard to evaluate as there is a scarcity of reliable data as well as fluctuations caused by floods and droughts. The main subsistence crops are maize, rice, sorghum, millet, groundnuts and cassava. Livestock is of secondary importance, due to the existence of the tsetse fly in about two-thirds of the country and ordinarily the country does not produce enough fresh meat for its own needs. Fishing is not a well-developed industry in Mozambique despite its long coastline and the volume of fish imported is greater than the annual catch although prawns are becoming an important exchange earner. Fishing is a relatively recent development and Cuban experts are training crews and a bright future seems assured for industrial fishing.

b. Industrial

Industrial growth did not really begin until the 1960's and manufacturing was still in its infancy at the time of independence. It was characterized by a predominance of industries processing agricultural raw materials, small plant size, and low output and accounted for about 10 per cent of GNP. Mozambique is still dependent on South Africa for most of its industrial products.

Approximately 47 per cent of Mozambique's manufacturing industries are located in Maputo or close by (Matola) and food processing is still the main sector of production. FRELIMO has sought to bring about decentralization by encouraging new industries to locate in Northern Mozambique. It is estimated on the whole that industrial output has been reduced by 30-50 per cent since independence in an area that was just in its infancy.

An oil refinery was built in Maputo in 1961 and a special oil terminal for crude oil was established at Matola to take advantage of break bulk deliveries. In May 1977, the government nationalized the oil refinery and employed Rumanian technicians to run it. There is also a strategic oil pipeline from Beira to Umtali in Rhodeisa.

Those manufacturing industries which were abandoned by their Portuguese owners were nationalized and have been taken over by workers and run as collectives. Production on the average is only about a third of previous levels.

The list of Mozambique's underground deposits reads like a geological dictionary. These include gold, copper, coal, diamonds, natural gas and perhaps oil. Mozambique has the world's largest known reserves of colombo-tantalite, a strategic mineral used in the production of hard steel.

[Ref. 38] There is as yet no great development in the area of mineral resources although substantial quantities of coal are mined.

Just prior to independence gas deposits were reported that put Mozambique ninth in the league of world gas deposits. [Ref. 39] Petroleum prospecting has intensified since 1975 but uncertainty of the new government's policies has discouraged many companies in the field of hydro carbons.

The country's electrical generating capacity has been expanded greatly in recent years with addition of the Cabora Bassa high dam on the Zambezi which is the world's fifth largest dam in kilowatt generation almost double that of the Aswan High Dam. Funded by a South African sponsored international consortium most of the power produced is exported to South Africa to cover the costs of the project and Mozambique is only now beginning to receive income from it. (The transmission of power to South Africa has continually been the subject of attacks by Mozambique revolutionaries belonging to the RNM and it is not a dependable source of power.)

c. Service Sector

Mozambique can best be described as a service economy for its principal neighbors South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. This is due to the transit trade undertaken with these countries which resulted in a well-developed system of railroads leading to the ports with IO access (Maputo, Beira, and Nacala). Along with this transit function Mozambique also provided migrant labor to work in the mines of South Africa and Zimbabwe as well as tourist facilities (beaches) for their use.

The importance of the services sector in the economy is explained by Mozambique's coastal position and the mineral wealth of its neighbors. Railroads play a dominant part in the economy carrying some 7,886,000 tons of freight in 1979. Revenue from South African use of Mozambican railways and harbors amounted to about \$93 million in 1977. In February 1979 Mozambique concluded an agreement with South Africa that will raise South African exports through Mozambique to 30-35,000 tons per day by late 1981. In June 1980, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique agreed on a 10-year program to maximize co-ordinated use of Mozambican railways and harbors at a cost of \$2,000 million to alleviate the transport problems of the three first-mentioned countries and the Mozambican dependence on South African traffic.

The reduction of Mozambican labor recruited for South African mines to 30-40,000 from a previous recruitment of 100,000 combined with suspension of the payment of the wages in gold by South Africa at a bonus rate have reduced Mozambique's foreign exchange earnings greatly. This had an adverse effect on the economy in many ways.

Since independence, Mozambique's tourist industry which was centered at Beira and Maputo has almost ceased to exist due to the general insecurity of the country and the fear of the Rhodesian and South African visitors. By 1978, all organized tourism had ceased but Mozambique's need to earn more foreign currency necessitated the dispatch of a FRELIMO

delegation to South Africa in January 1979 at which time it was announced that Mozambique was to reopen the country's borders to South African tourists.

d. Finance

Since independence, the Mozambican budget has been characterized by an increasing deficit. The regular government budget is expected to show an accumulated deficit of \$720 mn in 1980.

The huge fall in output of Mozambique's five main agricultural export crops have meant the loss of export revenue even if the value of imports would have remained at the same level.

Mozambique's constant trade deficits were usually partially offset by the invisible surplus obtained from tourism, the shipment of foreign goods by Mozambique's railways and ports, and the supply of labor to South African mines. Not only are the trade deficits widening but the earnings of the invisibles are substantially declining.

The total public sector deficit is also growing when the losses incurred by the nationalized industries (all of which are self-financing and borrow from the government banking system to cover their deficits) are taken into account. These deficits are financed by the central bank with a consequent growth in money supply, which has increased inflation and the balance of payments deficit.

The government has undertaken a review of foreign debts in order to obtain a more accurate picture of claims that foreign debt obligations will have on future earnings. On March 31, 1978, Mozambique's foreign debt obligation totaled some \$110.5 mn.

A drastic austerity program which involved rationing and freezing of imports and salaries was undertaken and in August 1979, President Machel turned to private investors to boost development.

Mozambique has to date signed mutual cooperation and development assistance agreements with the following 18 countries: Bulgaria, China, Cuba, North Korea, Denmark, East Germany, Guinea, Hungary, India, Italy, Libya, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, Tanzania, the USSR and Zambia. Within these agreements financing has been arranged for some projects included in the national investment program. Improved relations with Western countries could also lead to help for the first time from the main multilateral donors. [Ref. 40]

The continuing congressional ban on AID to Mozambique remains a source of bitterness among Mozambican leaders.

e. Foreign Trade

Mozambique neither publishes international trade statistics nor does it provide official balance of payments statistics on a transaction basis. However, the latest UN report on Mozambique (DOC A/33/173) has provided some estimates.

TREND OF FOREIGN TRADE (mn\$) [Ref. 41]

	1976	1977	1978
Imports	396	495	635
Exports	<u>147</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>205</u>
Balance	-249	-345	-450

MAIN ITEMS OF TRADE (mn\$) [Ref. 42]

<u>EXPORTS</u>		<u>IMPORTS</u>	
Cashew Nuts	50	Food Products	90
Prawns & Lobster	25	Crude Oil	105
Raw Cotton	20	Textiles	45
Tea	20	Equipment	155
Cement	10	Spare Parts	55
Other	<u>80</u>	Ind. Raw Mat.	<u>155</u>
	205		635

In 1977, Mozambique's principal imports (dollar value) were from South Africa, Fed. Republic of Germany, Portugal, Iraq, the United Kingdom, and Japan while her principal exports were to the U.S.A., Portugal, United Kingdom, South Africa, Netherlands and Japan.

3. Comoros

Even before its independence from France in 1975, the economy of the Comoros was in terrible condition. The French had paid for the majority of the substantial imports of food necessary for the survival of the population and when France

decided to curtail all aid upon independence the population faced starvation. The U.N. provided for emergency shipments of rice to the islands and the crisis was averted when the Arab States decided to furnish the country with some sizeable loans in 1976.

There is an absence of reliable data on the economic affairs of the Comoros and in general it can be said that things are no better or no worse than the years before.

a. Agricultural/Industrial

Agriculture is the most important economic activity furnishing over 95 per cent of the exports which are mainly vanilla, essential oils, cloves, copra, coffee and cocoa. There is a chronic shortage of cultivable land and the population has been increasing. Local subsistence farming with basic implements and techniques cannot keep up with the population. The yields per acre are poor, storage facilities non-existent and most of the choice land is set aside for export crop production. The main food crops are cassava, sweet potatoes, rice and bananas. Practically all meat and vegetables must be imported along with additional amounts of rice.

The French had encouraged only the development of estate grown cash crops of vanilla, ylang-ylang, copra and cloves. Most of the profits were transferred abroad and the only industry developed was for the preparation of crops for export.

Programs are currently being undertaken to increase coconut and copra production under the auspice of an IDA loan and the UNDP is planning projects in agriculture, land use and fisheries. Fishing is underdeveloped and only carried out on a small scale.

The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa has committed \$8 million for the development of the port of Mutsamudu on Anjouan. The balance of this \$41 mn project is coming from the KDFAED, the OPEC FUND, the SFD and other agencies and banks. The project is designed to expand the port's facilities so that it can receive much larger freighters. [Ref. 43]

The Comoros lack the physical infrastructure that is necessary for the development of the islands. The transportation system is highly inadequate and the improvement of the road network is a necessity prior to agricultural development. The island's docking facilities are inadequate and basic with large ships unloading offshore into dhows which is very difficult in the cyclone season. Most freight is transhipped from Dar Es salaam or Reunion and pilferage is a constant problem. [Ref. 44]

In the past little was done to improve the productivity of the small farms which are the key to the agricultural sector. Although the island is lacking in natural resources, there is still room for expansion of crop production, the development of a fishing industry and small

scale livestock raising, as well as small industries. Skilled manpower must be trained and a source of external aid must be secured.

The islands, already overcrowded in relation to the resources available, have a severe population problem that must be corrected. The government does not possess a population policy and there are no programs designed to aid family planning. These programs must be undertaken soon or the problems of overpopulation will increase and in fact accelerate.

Technical assistance is needed in all areas and this assistance will be needed for a number of years before it can be phased out. According to the World Bank, the Comoros might be able to achieve budgetary self-sufficiency in a 10 to 15 year period of time if they can receive a reliable long term commitment for aid. [Ref. 45]

b. Finance

French aid up until 1975 allowed the Comoros to operate a permanent trade deficit as well as a budgetary one but allowed for no development. After declaring itself "The Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros" several Arab organizations came forward in 1976-77 with financial aid. These include the Arab League, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. The People's Republic of China also assisted. Following the coup of May 1978 relations improved with France and French aid began anew while additional financial assistance

was obtained from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman and the EEC. Loans have also been granted by the African Development Fund and OPEC.

The 1981 Budget estimates expenditures of \$13.8 million and capital spending of 4.1 million. A total of \$6.5 million was to be found from external sources - mainly the EEC, Kuwait and the People's Republic of China - to cover the recurrent budget deficit.

c. Foreign Trade

The Comoros principal trading partners in 1977 for imports were France, Madagascar, Kenya and Tanzania, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China and for exports France, the U.S.A., Madagascar and the Federal Republic of Germany. The dollar value of imports was greater than that of exports by a ratio of 2:1.

4. Mauritius

Mauritius is an excellent example of a one-crop economy. Sugar is the principal crop and accounts for about seventy-five percent of the foreign exchange earnings. Occupying over ninety percent of the cultivable land and engaging about thirty percent of the work force sugar is king. This being the case economic growth is dependent upon the world price of sugar, the weather in Mauritius, and the size of the crop.

a. Agricultural/Industrial

Sugar is the major crop and is grown on almost one half of the area of the island. There are a number of large sugar estates on the island with their own processing factories in addition to thousands of small planters. The sugar industry on Mauritius is faced with numerous problems including; rising labor costs, low productivity, rising costs of fertilizer and machinery, and cyclones or adverse weather. All sugar is marketed through the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate.

Most of the island's sugar was traditionally sold to Britain at a guaranteed price but under the Lome Convention of 1975 Mauritius was given a quota of 500,000 metric tons to be provided to the EEC. Production in 1979 had risen to about 700,000 tons but a series of cyclones at the end of the year and in 1980 reduced the 1980 output to 475,000 tons. [Ref. 46]

A guaranteed price for the sugar is negotiated yearly within the EEC and until 1981 the world market price had been higher than the guaranteed price. Only a small portion of Mauritian sugar is sold on the world market and the main buyers are Canada, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The low sugar output of 1980 coupled with a rising import bill has led to a negative balance of payments. Production needs to be increased through modernization but the natural topography of the island makes this very difficult and costly. Rum and molasses are two important by-products of sugar production.

A Tea Development Authority was established in 1971 to accelerate tea cultivation in the highlands and Mauritius has become an exporter of tea on a small scale. The tea production has been held back by labor shortages and rising costs of production. Tobacco is the other cash crop of the island.

Mauritius has become self-sufficient in poultry meat and egg production however it is deficient in rice, milk, beef and pork. Fish is usually imported and the infant fishing industry is receiving technical assistance from the Soviets and the Japanese. A joint tuna packing company was established with the aid of the Japanese in 1972 and this company exports to the EEC. In 1980, Mauritius received its first shipment of tuna from the Seychelles for processing.

The Mauritian industrial sector is small and concentrates on the area of import substitution of consumer products in an effort to reduce the island's high import bill. The government has adopted a policy of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) which focus on labor-intensive processing of imported goods which are in turn exported. This is an attempt to reduce the country's dependence on the sugar industry and unemployment. Total exports from the EPZs have increased and it is expected that eventually they will play an important role in the economy.

b. Tourism

Tourism is currently the third most important earner of foreign exchange for the island. The majority of tourists are from Reunion, South Africa, France and Britain. The rising cost of fuel, overseas recessions, and the cyclones of 1979-80 have had an adverse effect on the tourist industry and the Mauritian economy. Tourist arrivals have been declining since 1980 and no new construction has taken place in the tourist industry since 1978. [Ref. 47]

c. Finance

Mauritius has obtained aid from both bilateral and multilateral sources. In the bilateral area the primary donors have been Britain, France, India and the Federal Republic of Germany while in the multilateral area the World Bank, the Arab Development Fund Bank, the European Development Fund and various other Arab sources have provided the funds.

The external public debt increased sharply in 1978 rising to \$270.3 million. Foreign reserves at the end of August 1980 were estimated to be an alarming \$13.2 million which barely covered a weeks worth of imports. Needless to say Mauritius finds itself in a very acute balance of payments crisis. [Ref. 48] By mid-1979 World Bank loans had risen to \$14.3 million. The IMF has again come to the aid of the island by approving a new standby agreement which allows for reconstruction expenditure, while limiting the 1980/81 balance of payments deficit to SDR 75 million (\$97 million). A "two

year" plan designed to bring the economy into equilibrium was published in September 1980. The targets of this plan are an improved balance of payments, reduction of the budget deficit, and a real growth rate of 5 to 6 percent. All of this looks fine on paper but it is based upon a rapid recovery in 1981 which in turn is dependent on a good sugar harvest. [Ref. 49] Because of its poor economic performance due to the low sugar output in 1981, Mauritius is unable to obtain commercial credit from Western banks and must look for other sources of aid. [Ref. 56] Soaring inflation and rising unemployment along with the drastic impact of the cyclones and their resulting damage to crops, buildings and communications have placed the economy in a desperate position.

Despite government action inflation and balance of payments appear to be beyond their control. The IMF agreement provides a medium term solution but places strict conditions on the aid. The outlook for the 1980s does not appear to be very encouraging. The forecasts call for increasing unemployment and the inability to create enough new jobs despite the "two year" plan. Free social services and state subsidies cannot be continued unless money is contributed by those employed. The future of the EPZ is in doubt in Mauritius as it will face competition from newly created Zones in Kenya and Sri Lanka. [Ref. 51]

d. Foreign Trade

FOREIGN TRADE (in million Mauritian rupees) [Ref. 52]

	1977	1978	1979
Exports f.o.b.	2,041.2	1,195	2,855
Imports c.i.f.	<u>2,950.8</u>	<u>3,075</u>	<u>3,500</u>
Trade Balance	-909.6	-1,100	-645.0

Mauritius exports the largest amount of its goods (dollar value) to Britain, South Africa, France, Japan, Australia and West Germany. Mauritius does import about the same amount of goods from the U.S. that it does from China however trade with the Soviet Union appears to be insignificant.

5. The Seychelles

Traditionally the Seychelles has been a plantation economy which produced copra, cinnamon, vanilla and patchouli along with dried fish and guano for export. With the opening of an international airport in 1971, all of this changed. Although agriculture is still important, tourism has become the dominant sector of the economy. In fact, tourism has become so dominant that the government is attempting to bring back traditional industries and establish new ones in order to become less dependent upon tourism.

The Seychelles has been placing a lot of emphasis on the exploitation of its territorial waters both for the development of a fishing industry and the exploration of oil.

Since independence Britain and France have provided most of the Seychelle's economic aid but that has begun to

change. The Seychelles usually runs a trade deficit that must be offset by aid, private capital investment and the service sector (tourism). [Ref. 53]

a. Agricultural

Being a scattered group of small islands the area of cultivable land is extremely limited and in most cases the soil is not of good quality. The Seychelles is dependent on imported food and the government is attempting to reduce this dependency. The country's five year plan which was begun in 1978 and was revised in 1979 and 1980 concentrates on increasing agricultural production. By extending land settlement schemes and creating more commercial farms under the Seychelles Agricultural Development Company (SADECO) the government hopes to raise food production. Another priority is the development of some of the outer islands which could become sources of food. If settlement of the outer islands of Coetivy, Farquhar, Desroches, Astove and Providence can be undertaken it is felt that agricultural production and the annual fish catch will both increase. The five islands that are targeted for development will receive investment in the fishing and copra industries as well as basic infrastructure (housing, roads, water, electricity, etc.). Settlers will be given parcels of land and homes and the administration will buy their cash crops. [Ref. 54]

Until recently the fish resources were scarcely exploited by the Seychelles and only enough fish were caught

to supply domestic consumption and a small export industry. In 1978, the Seychelles National Fishing Company (SNAFIC) was established to begin exporting tuna with projected earnings of \$4-6 million per year. The Seychelles has received aid from four countries in its endeavor: Libya has donated two aircraft for fishing surveillance, Spain has agreed to teach Seychellois fishermen tuna fishing, India sent a delegation to advise on marine farming, and France has sent four tuna boats and conducted a feasibility study of fish stocks in the area. [Ref. 55] Also in 1978, the Seychelles declared a 200 mile "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ) which was designed to reduce the activities of foreign fishing fleets which freely operated in the area. Foreign vessels are now required to purchase licenses if they intend to fish in the EEZ. Britain, France, Libya and India provide assistance in the patrolling of the EEZ. A joint fisheries venture has been undertaken with Iraq.

b. Industrial

Under the National Development Plan several small industrial projects have been undertaken primarily in the agro-industrial field. Most of these were designed in the short run for import substitution but it is hoped that later they will develop into exports. These include fruit juice and milk processing, a pork processing plant and pig farm, a plant for processing copra into coconut oil, a salt-making plant and an ice-making plant for the fishing industry. Aid

for these projects has come from India, Abu Dhabi, Britain, France and Iraq as well as various international agencies.

c. Tourism

About 90 percent of the foreign exchange earned is provided by tourism. Since the opening of the international airport in 1971 the number of tourists has risen from three thousand to some seventy-eight thousand in 1979. The climate is a very pleasant tropical maritime one and the islands are known for their spectacular mountains and ocean scenery.

[Ref. 56] Much of the revenue earned from the tourist trade leaves the country in order to pay for the food and other goods utilized by the tourists and the tourist industry. Only about 14 percent of the revenue goes to the government primarily through hotel and restaurant taxes. The number of tourists visiting the islands in 1980 began to decline mainly due to the rise in air fares. It is anticipated that recovery will commence now that air fares have been reduced. Airport facilities are currently being modernized to handle the expected increase in tourists. The prohibition of South African Airways flights to the islands which began in 1980 greatly affected the important tourist trade from that country. Until the recent coup attempt of November 1981, this trade was returning to normal levels through the use of Swaziland airlines. The primary influx of tourists come from France, Britain and Ireland but efforts are being undertaken to attract tourists from the Middle East, the United States and

the Far East. The government maintains strict controls on tourist development taking into account environmental and social considerations. A maximum limit of 120,000 visitors per year has been established. If the tourist recession continues it will have an overall dampening effect on the economic activity of the Seychelles since it accounts for about 20 percent of the G.D.P.

d. Finance

Since 1979, the Seychelles rupee has been linked to the IMF Special Drawing Right (SDR) instead of sterling. This was influenced by a desire to achieve a more stable exchange rate.

The trade deficit always appears large with exports only accounting for about 20 percent of the dollar value of imports. Most of the imports are machinery, transport equipment, petroleum products, and food and beverages for the tourist industry. This deficit is countered by the earnings from the tourist sector and external aid along with private investment. While there was a small balance of payments deficit in 1979 this was overcome in 1980 at which time the Seychelles managed without budgetary aid from Britain for the first time. Until recently most aid came from Britain but the Seychelles has now diversified and receives its aid from a host of sources including the World Bank, the EEC, Western Europe, India and Arab countries and funds.

Despite the fact that the government has taken over major shareholding in key sectors through the Seychelles National Investment Corporation there is no general nationalization policy and the government encourages foreign investment. The Finance Ministry has denied rumors that the government intends to introduce exchange controls [Ref. 57] and taxed profits are easily repatriated. The G.D.P. has continued to grow.

e. Foreign Trade

EXTERNAL TRADE (R_S million)

	1977	1978	1979
Imports c.i.f.	349.7	402.1	561.7
Exports f.o.b.	77.8	96.1	114.5

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES (R_S million)

IMPORTS C.F.		EXPORTS f.o.b. (including re-exports)	
	1979		1979
Food, beverages and tobacco	99.7	Copra	19.9
Petroleum Products	128.8	Cinnamon	1.8
Manufactures	135.1	Fish	6.1
Machinery and transport	162.7	Guano	1.8
Others	<u>35.4</u>	Coconuts	<u>N.a.</u>
Total	561.7		30.8

The Seychelles principal trading partners in 1978 for imports (dollar value) were Britain, Kenya, South Africa, Singapore, Japan and Baharain and for exports Pakistan, India, Reunion and Mauritius. Britain supplied over 25 per cent of the dollar value of all imports.

III. THE REGIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION

Less than a decade ago the islands of the WIO were secluded and obscure, existing in a world distant from all major sources of power and under the colonial mastery of weakening European "empires". Only the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) was formally independent but so closely aligned with France that its independence was more fiction than fact. The Comoros were firmly attached to France while the British governed the Seychelles and Mauritius, and the Portuguese controlled Mozambique. The development of the areas role in world politics will be examined from the period since 1971. With the announced historic British military withdrawal "East of Suez" in 1968, the necessity of France to reevaluate its position in 1972 after the political change in Madagascar, and Mozambique's independence from Portugal in 1974 the political complexion of the WIO was to change. Into an area previously dominated by fading European empires came the superpowers: the United States, the Soviet Union and China. The communist nations have displayed a long interest in the area and the unstable political atmosphere of the countries in the WIO presents a unique opportunity for them. The countries of the WIO are generally politically unstable and poor with no stable regional actor to influence them. Commencing with the 1970's the islands of the WIO were

undergoing political change as they attempted to find their own identity. Colonial influence was cast aside by the new countries and a great deal of hostility was directed at the former colonial power.

It appears that through a coincidence of fate that just at the moment that the superpowers were becoming aware of the vacuum in the WIO the area was undergoing a traumatic political realignment which was opposed to external interference. Throughout the area there was a great outcry for external powers to keep out of the Indian Ocean. The heritage of the colonial period had left a strong distaste for non-regional powers, whether they were communist or noncommunist.

The Third World/non-aligned nations in the world form a formidable voting bloc in the United Nations and this gives the states a great deal of political influence in the international arena. It is of utmost importance for the United States to maintain this influential voting bloc on its side in world affairs.

The politics of the countries of the WIO will be addressed in detail in the following sections. [Ref. 58]

A. MADAGASCAR

In 1890, Britain recognized France's commanding position on the island of Madagascar. France annexed the island in 1896. This incorporation into the French political and economic realm did not resolve the ethnic and religious

conflicts between the Merina tribe who were Malayo-Polynesian and converted to British Protestantism and the Negroid coastal tribes or cotiers who were converted to Catholicism by the French . By 1905 the French conquest of the island was completed and French institutions introduced (administration, schools, medical clinics, etc.) and the island was integrated into France's economy.

The Merina, who were better educated, resented their subordinate status to the Europeans. They looked upon themselves as the rightful rulers of Madagascar and various national "plots" were to take place beginning in 1915. A violent revolt in 1947 was inspired by the Merina but the cotiers bore the punishment. The results of this event are still felt to this day and this episode only served to increase the hostility between the two main ethnic groups on the island. In order to counteract the more nationalistic and educated Merina the French colonial administration developed a political party, the Parti Social Democrate (PSD), composed of cotiers. The PSD was officially formed in 1957 under the leadership of Philibert Tsiranana an educated cotier who had obtained political experience in the French national assembly as Madagascar's deputy and had joined the socialist party. The PSD expanded and in 1960 when Madagascar was granted independence Tsiranana was elected the first president. The granting of independence by France in 1960 without an armed struggle was a decisive factor in establishing the close collaboration that subsequently characterized Franco-Malagasy relations.

The constitution of 1959 was based on the French presidential model. The structure it set up enabled Tsiranana to build a strong central government and consolidate his power. In the legislature and senate all but a scarce few were members of the PSD. Eventually the PSD incorporated all except two rival parties and the only significant political opposition was the left-wing Party of the Congress of Independence (AKFM) formed in 1958 by a Merina Protestant minister, Richard Andrianamanjato. The conflict between the cotiers and the Merina continued on political, cultural, geographic and ethnic grounds.

Peace and stability ended after 1969. The island's economy was hard hit by the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 and the devaluation of the franc in 1969 as well as the French strikes of 1968. The government encountered increasing opposition when it attempted to confirm monopolies on French firms and to cultivate closer relations with South Africa. These two issues caused PSD dissidents to join with the AKFM against the government. Up until this time Madagascar's diplomatic relations were limited to countries of the Western bloc although there were trade agreements with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Traditionally the Malagasy who felt superior or indifferent to the Africans, have remained separated from the African mainland. Tsiranana could see the danger inherent in isolation so he joined organizations developed by moderate francophone Africans and became a staunch supporter of the Organization commune africaine, malgache (OCAM).

Tsirananana became seriously ill in 1969. While he was away from Madagascar disagreement within the PSD on economic policies became a serious issue (as was the question of his successor). Returning in May 1970, the elections of September 1970 reinforced PSD's position on the island and limited the AKFM base to the urban Merina population. In April 1971, the peasantry in the Toliary region belonging to the MONIMA opposition party under Monja Jaona took up arms against the government because of excessive taxation and abuses of local officials. There were many deaths and the revolt was crushed but it had transformed a leftwing regional group into an opposition movement comprising students and urban radical elements. The U.S. Ambassador and a large part of his staff were expelled in 1971.

Tsirananana became obsessed with saving Madagascar from communist subversion. He demoted the PSD's most outstanding member who proposed a more nationalistic and socialistic policy and he strengthened links with South Africa despite intense opposition within his own party. He presented himself as the sole candidate in the elections of January 1972 and interpreted his victory as overwhelming popular support for himself and his platform. On 13 May 1972 riots broke out between security forces and a union of students, teachers and laborers which became the KIM or Federation of the May 13th Movement. After a violent three days Tsirananana turned over full authority to General Ramanantsoa chief of staff of the

armed forces who was a Merina without any political aspirations.

Displaying even handedness and adopting a pragmatic approach, Ramanantsoa eliminated the violence and won widespread support. Installing loyal military officers to governmental posts and as provincial governors he ensured control. His background as an officer in the French army was very reassuring to France who maintained troops on the island but had thus far not intervened in Tsiranana's behalf. Tsiranana was retained as a figurehead president despite strong protests by radical students.

The KIM was pacified by Ramanantsoa's policy of renegotiating cooperation agreements with France, liberation of political prisoners and the termination of diplomatic relations with Israel, South Africa and Taiwan. Freedom to express political views was endorsed by Ramanantsoa but he also assumed the authority to declare martial law. Receiving support from all of the political parties with the exception of the PSD and extreme KIM followers Ramanantsoa received about 80 percent of the vote in the October 1972 election. This polarity enabled him to remove Tsiranana and dissolve all existing elected institutions and designate 1977 as the year for national elections and a constitutional referendum.

Ramanantsoa established diplomatic relations with China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and various Arab states along with

strengthening ties to African states. The PLO and the Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara were also recognized. His most controversial policy was his cultural policy of promoting Malagasy as it revived cotier fear of a Merina dominated state. Riots and strikes disrupted the country from December 1972 - April 1973 and threatened to culminate in civil war. The renegotiation of cooperation agreements with France undertaken by Lieutenant Commander Ratsiraka satisfied the most ardent nationalists in particular the radicals. Under the new agreement, Madagascar withdrew from the franc zone in May and OCAM in August 1973. In addition, France was to evacuate its air and naval installations on the island by September.

Madagascar's trade and finance suffered a sharp decline after the break with France. Mismanagement and corruption had crept into the economy and administration and the unity of the armed forces began to erode. Officers in the cabinet began to express different ideologies and soon factionalized into moderate and radical groups. Friction between cotiers and the Merina increased along with political turmoil and violence.

In December 1974, a mutiny by a mobile police garrison near the capitol forced Ramanantsoa to make the first changes in the Government he had established in 1972. Suddenly on 5 February 1975 Ramanantsoa turned his power over to Col. Ratsimandrava who was assassinated six days later. It has

been said that Ratsimandrava was uncorruptable and this may have been the reason for his assassination. A military directorate under General Andriamahazo consisting of 18 military members including Ratsiraka took over. Loyal troops put down the mutiny but martial law was declared, the press was censored and political parties were suspended.

On 24 March 1975, Ratsiraka became the head of the government. He was a fairly popular individual who was known as a diplomat; he had kept his reputation clean by not taking part in Ratsimandrava's government or in his assassination. However, he does not appear to have much knowledge of the rural society in Madagascar. Ratsiraka maintained the Higher Council on Institutions to monitor the constitution and renamed the military directorate. He created a military Supreme Revolutionary Council under his command. In July he closed the U.S. satellite-tracking station and began to expand his policy of socialism. In his "Little Red Book" of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution he pledged to expand the Merina village communities and to carry out agricultural and administrative reforms while reorganizing the armed forces into an instrument of development to execute his programs. He began to pursue a foreign policy of improved relations with communist and Arab states in addition to support for anti-imperialist liberation movements in the Third World.

Ratsiraka held a referendum in December 1975 to legitimize his government. This referendum elected him to a seven-year

term as President of the Democrat Republic of Madagascar and empowered him with the means to apply his own form of socialism to Madagascar. The ideology of the state is socialist and is expressed in the Malagasy Socialist Revolutionary Charter.

Institutions were quickly set up to meet the requirements of the Charter and they included the presidency, the Supreme Council of the Revolution (CSR), the Advisory Military Committee for Development (CMD), a Constitutional High Court, a National Assembly and a cabinet appointed by the head of state and responsible to him. In 1976, the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA) was formed by Ratsiraka. Its purpose was to provide ideological education and information to the people in order to develop socialism and reject capitalism and imperialism. AREMA quickly took control of the country and dominated the elections of 1977.

Proceeding on the principle that without political independence or freedom, economic independence is an impossibility the government has carried out the nationalization of key sectors of the economy along with large foreign and domestic companies...oil production, from import to refinement and distribution, is under state control, as is the case with other energy sources. The same is true of mining and transportation along with other national resources. Nationalization has been extended to about 40% of the industries, and the remaining private industrial enterprises have accepted state

ownership of their capital, in most cases amounting to a majority share. Efforts are continuing to strengthen the state sector and maintain strict control over the private sector, however this is proceeding with a great deal of caution. [Ref. 59]

Ratsiraka has repeatedly stressed that he aims at "drastic and revolutionary transformation in all directions" ("transformations drastiques et revolutionnaires tous azimuths").

He has laid the framework for such changes but the people are difficult to move - especially the rural masses who are, even more ingrained in their ways than peasantries in various other countries. The basis for Madagascar's economic revolution must be a sudden increase in its agricultural production. [Ref. 60] The rural population in Madagascar is scattered, separated by long distances with a bad transportation network, and is often forced to turn inward on its own inherited social structures. One of the basic problems both politically and economically in Madagascar, has been how to communicate with the rural population. [Ref. 61]

In order to undertake massive agrarian reform it was necessary to reorganize the country into semi-autonomous village units (fokontany) with individual village councils (fokonolona). Under this system Madagascar was divided into village communities of about 500 rural inhabitants. Fokonolona is the central element in Madagascar's attempts to decentralize the administration and introduce socialism to the country.

It is the spearhead of the "peasants revolution" and unlike the Ujamaa village in Tanzania their origins can be found in Madagascar's past. Fokonolona is a politico-economic structure which is based primarily on rural communities. The initial aim of fokonolona is to gain a degree of local solidarity, encourage small communities to become as self-sufficient as possible and to establish "decentralized collectives". In the long run the system is designed to provide the masses, with a direct hand in the administration of the country. Power eventually will lie with the fokonolona rather than with a strong central government. [Ref. 62]

Currently the real power lies with the President and the 21-members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (CSR). The president is Head of State, chairman of the CSR (whose members are appointed by the president) and secretary-general of AREMA, the main political party. The president also appoints the Prime Minister. [Ref. 63] In short he is all powerful.

The Malagasy political structure is as follows:

1. The dominant AREMA party of the President is a broad-based party which is influential in the capital and outlying districts as well as in non-Merina coastal towns. It in turn is divided into a right wing led by Simon Pierre and Rakotovao Razakaboana which has its strength in the Merina areas of the high plateau while most of its senior members come from the capital's elite families (including the President) and a left wing headed by Ampy Portos which recruits from the student

ranks, trade unions and in coastal areas. It controls 112 of 137 Parliamentary seats.

2. The second largest party is the pro-Soviet Independence Party (AKFM) led by Richard Andriamanjato with its roots in the nationalist sections of the commercial classes in and about the capital. It has 16 Parliamentary seats.

3. The VONJY or Vanguard Party under Dr. Razanabahini which follows a mild social democratic policy and is primarily a coastal party with many members of former President Tsiranana's dissolved PSD. It holds seven Parliamentary seats.

4. UDEMA is a left-wing Christian Democrat party headed by Ramoarsata with little influence in the government.

5. The VSM, or Socialist MONIMA Bloc which is a splinter group from the original MONIMA party.

6. The MFM (or Party of the Small People) which is factionalized into two sections one which supports the government and one which does not. Both are radical and favor collectivization.

7. The MONIMA - originel party under Monja Jaona is the most influential party outside of the government. Without being consistently pro Chinese it does emphasize that the Chinese revolution was correct to mobilize the rural population for social change and development. Jaona is the rallying point for the discontented youth of Madagascar and is a figure closely indentified with nationalism. [Ref. 64]

The government of President Ratsiraka looks extremely uneasy, despite the decision of Monja Jaona, the government's

only real opposition, to rally to the regime, thereby ending four months of house arrest (Nov 1980-Feb 1981) and violence. The cumulative effects of the economic malaise, severe shortages of goods and student rioting have caused Ratsiraka to grant concessions. But the balance of power in Madagascar remains uncertain. [Ref. 65] President Ratsiraka's strongest card may be the fact that, because of his previous policies, there are no immediate alternatives to his regime for although Jaona symbolizes opposition to the regime he does not appear to be a credible candidate for prime minister and the MONIMA's power base is confined mostly to the southern part of the country. [Ref. 66]

President Ratsiraka has driven most of the political opposition to his rule underground and it is hard to determine which political figures he can rely on. By extending security controls he appears to have reinforced his position. Ratsiraka is an admirer of North Korean leader Kim Il Song and the North Koreans opened a training institute at Tematave in 1978 which is staffed and financed by them. In addition, the President's bodyguards were trained by the North Koreans. When Soviet deliveries of MIG-21's were delayed in 1978 North Korea came to his aid and loaned him a number of MIG-17's complete with pilots and training crews. North Koreans and Russians have assisted in the reorganization of the country's security arm.

The insecurity and suspicious nature of the regime poses a hazard to political activity. Foreigners have been under

particularly close surveillance after the coup in the Comoros in May 1978 led by Bob Denard and his mercenaries. The country has been put on alert numerous times when it has been alleged that foreign aircraft have flown over the island or submarines were observed off of the coast. This continuing nervousness about being deposed is a very real concern. In the period from 1972-75 there have been six governments with five different heads of state, one of whom was assassinated. A great deal of political turmoil and antagonism has been experienced in Madagascar. The terrorism and sabotage continues and presents constant problems for the country.

Ratsiraka's foreign policy has been officially labeled as one of "active neutralism" although he prefers to associate with the leaders of North Korea, Tanzania and Cuba he has been forced to look toward France to bail him out of his economic plight. In return for this aid, France has been exerting pressure on Madagascar's foreign policy particularly with regard to the dispute over a number of the Mozambique Channel islands currently occupied by France but claimed by Madagascar. Relations with the U.S. are improving with full relations reestablished in November 1980 but Ratsiraka is urgently trying to forge stronger links with African regimes in Tanzania, Mozambique and the Seychelles while maintaining socialist bloc connections. The Soviets have provided Madagascar civilian and military equipment while concentrating their influence on education and the armed forces. The total strength of the

armed forces has risen from 4,760 in 1975 to over 18,000 in 1980 with an influx of Soviet equipment including MIG aircraft and Mi-8 helicopters. The number of Malagasy students in Russia has risen from 200 in 1975 to 1000 in 1980. More than 1000 military technicians and advisors from the Soviet Union, North Korea, Cuba and East Germany are stationed in Madagascar [Ref. 67] but thus far the Soviet requests for facilities at the naval base of Diego Suarez have been rejected and the Soviets are limited to a number of mooring/refueling buoys that they have placed south of the island and in the Mozambique Channel.

Ratsiraka has repeatedly called for an international conference to make the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. He proposes the dismantling of all foreign military bases in the region and a reduction of forces already in the area. This proposal is linked with Madagascar's concern over French control over some of the smaller islands of the Indian Ocean including Europa, Bassas de India and the Glacieuusec near Madagascar; Tromelin which is claimed by Mauritius and the island of Mayotte that is claimed by the Comoros. [Ref. 68] This development bears witness to a new Madagascar sense of responsibility in dealing with Europe's residual claims in the Indian Ocean and the fact that with the Comoros, the Seychelles, and Mozambique independent Madagascar might accede to a position of central influence in the WIO region. [Ref. 69]

B. MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique had the misfortune of being a colony of Portugal for nearly 500 years. Over that period, the Portuguese did not attempt to train a civil service or establish indigenous political parties. Portugal discouraged local participation and kept most of the population illiterate. Opposition to Portuguese rule continued into the twentieth century with the Portuguese controlling the country through the use of the police and security forces as well as censorship of the press. Political and economic unrest were kept to a minimum and where it did occur the knowledge of the act was suppressed, however strikes and uprisings did take place. Many of the small number of educated Mozambicans fled to nearby countries in the 1950's; many others left in order to obtain schooling. This group of exiles developed political and social organizations in various countries which became the basis for a Mozambican nationalist movement. These men were greatly influenced by the ideas of nationalist parties in the countries they were now located in (Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, etc.) and soon became eager to rectify things in Mozambique. It did not take long for these expatriates to decide that independence from Portugal was a necessity. The Portuguese prevented these groups from organizing within Mozambique so they were destined to remain in different neighboring countries.

The major political groups that were formed outside of Mozambique were the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) which was founded in 1960 under Mathew Mwole and L.M. Millinga; the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) organized by Adelino Gwembi in 1959 in Rhodesia; and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI) under Baltazar Changonga formed in Malawi. These three groups were brought together in Tanzania in 1962 under a unified organization called the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique - FRELIMO) under Dr. Eduardo Mondlane. The combining of these parties did not unify the independence movement as much as had been anticipated and major splits occurred which led to the formation of other parties. In 1965 the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO) a coalition of a number of these new parties was organized, however, FRELIMO was the dominant organization. From the creation in 1962, FRELIMO had concentrated on the formation of a bureaucratic structure with a financial base and a program within Mozambique. FRELIMO gained the support of the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity and the Tanzanian government. FRELIMO held its first national congress in 1962 at which time it stated its goal of attaining self-government and independence for Mozambique. FRELIMO commenced its war against the Portuguese in Mozambique in September 1964.

In the period between 1966 and 1970 a number of assassinations occurred within FRELIMO not all of which were of Portuguese design. This in fighting tended to heighten tensions within FRELIMO and a number of party leaders broke off to form minor parties. In 1969, Mondlane was killed by a bomb sent through the mail and Samora Machel, who was commander of the FRELIMO army, eventually became president of the Central Committee after a brief experiment with a three-man presidential council (Simango, dos Santos, and Machel) ended in failure.

The ten year war for the liberation of Mozambique is now a matter of history which ended with the agreement at Lusaka on 7 September 1974. Power was to be transferred to FRELIMO and an interim - FRELIMO ruled government came into being on 25 September. Small opposition groups were quickly suppressed and when Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975 FRELIMO was in undisputed control having suppressed attempts to seize power in September and October.

FRELIMO has been led by a small tight-knit group of men with Machel as their leader. At independence Machel assumed the presidency of the country a position he has retained. Machel and his associates have dedicated themselves to making Mozambique into a Marxist state. From the very beginning the leaders of FRELIMO had sought creation of a society based on socialist lines and the role of ideology was stressed.

The Constitution of June 1975 states that power belongs to the workers and peasants united and led by FRELIMO and that FRELIMO is the leading force of the state and society. The party which determines the ideology of the state takes precedence over the government. The constitution also delineates the composition of the People's Assembly and designates it as the supreme organ of the state and the highest legislative organ of the Republic. This assembly was to meet twice a year in ordinary sessions and in the interim period a 15 member Permanent Commission elected by the Assembly from among its members would assume the function of the People's Assembly. The People's Assembly consisted of not more than 210 members of FRELIMO's Central and Executive committees; Ministers and Vice-Ministers of the Government; Provincial governors; members chosen by the Central Committee from among FRELIMO and FPLM (Mozambique People's Liberation Forces) cadres; two representatives, designated by the Central Committee, from each provincial mass organization; and at least 10 citizens chosen by the Central Committee.

Under the constitution the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique is the President of FRELIMO and the Head of State. His function is to create ministries, direct the activities of the Council of Ministers, appoint and dismiss members of the Council of Ministers, the President and Vice-President of the Supreme People's Court and the Attorney General, provincial governors, the general commander and

deputy of the Police Corps, the rector of the university and diplomatic representatives of the Republic; to declare a state of war and conclude peace; to proclaim mobilization; to promulgate laws; and in the event of his death or resignation his functions are to be assumed by FRELIMO's Central Committee who shall nominate a new President.

The Third National Congress held in Maputo in February 1977 designated FRELIMO as a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party and a new 67-member central committee and a new 10-member permanent political committee (which replaced the Executive Committee) were elected. Seven of the members of the Permanent Political Committee have been FRELIMO members since its inception in 1963. The core of the political power in the country became the Political Committee and the Council of Ministers.

FRELIMO's elite are not truly representative of Mozambique on a regional or ethnic base with most of the key figures coming from the far south of the country and being of non-African or mixed ancestry. Their strength is in their dedication to the party and they have no strong ethnic or regional base. Most of the actual fighters in the war for independence came from the north and there is a significant difference between the northerners and southerners (ethnically, culturally, socially and religiously). Despite appearances of similarities the two major areas of the country are not homogenous and there is a split which is widening as one group perceives itself losing out to the other.

FRELIMO is a very centralized organization which fits in well with Marxist-Leninist models and the country's past colonial experience. At all levels of the party and government the final decision rests with a very small inner elite group and the President is in control. It appears that all real power is in the hands of President Machel who is not opposed to utilizing it.

President Machel's cabinet has been known for its stability and very few have been dropped from it. His cabinet consists of ten blacks, eight whites, and one of mixed race while two of the black ministers are married to white South Africans. [Ref. 70] The Council of Ministers embraces more whites than any other government in black Africa and the People's Assembly is particularly unusual for a black African country in that it includes a number of white, Asian and women delegates (proportionately there are more women in the People's Assembly than there are in the U.S. House of Representatives). [Ref. 71]

FRELIMO has continued to attempt to concentrate its efforts on consolidating hegemony over the entire country. Consistently aware of its weakness in areas outside of the "liberated zones" it controlled during the war FRELIMO had to set up a one party state and then attempt to eliminate all forms of discontent. While measures were taken to consolidate the Party and to eliminate opposition through purges various organizations were developed to shore up the regime including the Mozambique Youth Organization (OJM). FRELIMO does not tolerate rival

centers of authority and this has led to continual internal conflict particularly with churches and a mandatory death penalty was introduced in 1979 for anyone convicted of high treason which was defined as violation of fundamental patriotic duties by committing acts which endanger national independence, territorial integrity, alter a state of peace or prevent FRELIMO from freely exercising their constitutional powers. Sentences were also provided for people found guilty of espionage and sabotage or terrorism. [Ref. 72]

Opposition to FRELIMO continues in Mozambique and can be traced to a number of reasons. Many of the educated people of the country were alarmed by FRELIMO's connection to Marxist-Leninism and the rapid nationalization of businesses and property as well as by the President's creation of a secret police force under his control which was used to suppress political opposition. Also FRELIMO launched an assault on the religious beliefs of the people and placed strict controls on churches. Opposition also arose over the fact that more people from the south are in positions of power than from the central or northern sections of the country. Perhaps the largest feeling of discontent has resulted from the economic problems that have beset the country since independence (declining income, unemployment, food rationing, gasoline rationing, etc.). Added to this was the removal of the Portuguese as an enemy which had been the prime unifying factor in the war. FRELIMO's decision to collectivize

agriculture by expanding the aldeamentos system which it had campaigned against under the Portuguese rule was a serious threat to FRELIMO's credibility with the agricultural majority.

The Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RNM) is the most active of all resistance movements. It formerly operated out of Rhodesia and its members are alleged to have been trained and equipped by the Rhodesian Special Branch. With the independence of Rhodesia in 1980 the RNM lost many of its secure bases and its activities decreased for a period of time. Recently their activities have been on the rise and they have cut the electric lines running from the Cabora Bassa dam. Currently it is believed that the RNM is receiving aid from South Africa, has an office in Portugal, and that it is financed by a Portuguese businessman by the name of Jorge Jardim. As disillusionment within Mozambique for FRELIMO increases it appears that the RNM will receive increased support and could become a greater thorn in the side of the government.

Mozambique along with Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and Angola form the so-called "frontline states" which were instrumental in the settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. Mozambique played a key role in this settlement as it not only gave its full support to the war by the Zimbabwean liberation movement but also closed off its borders to Rhodesia. Mozambique was also instrumental in the formation of the Patriotic Front and later was able to apply effective pressure on the Patriotic Front and force settlement. Even the United States gave Mozambique

the credit for breaking the final deadlock in the London talks. [Ref. 73] Because of its actions, Mozambique suffered greatly during the Rhodesian conflict. Rhodesian forces repeatedly attacked targets inside Mozambique and eventually the Front-line States were forced to coordinate their defense policies. The border closure had drastic economic impact on Mozambique's economy and the economy has still not recovered. A close friendship developed between President Machel and Prime Minister Mugabe and in January 1981 Zimbabwe and Mozambique signed a defence treaty which bound the countries to come to one another's aid if South Africa attacked one of them.

While Mozambique's foreign relations are governed by a policy of non-alignment, it desires to strengthen its relations with other Marxist-Leninist governments as well as expanding its relations with other regional participants. President Machel has long been an advocate of removing white rule from southern Africa and has been a prominent figure in attempting to reduce the dependence of nearby states on South Africa. He has hosted the Southern African Coordination Conference in an effort to obtain foreign funds for regional development projects that will make the countries more independent of South Africa. Mozambique has often expressed concern about military forces in the Indian Ocean and has thrown its support behind the Zone of Peace move which is an article in the Constitution.

While it is true that China had been the largest supplier of aid to FRELIMO up until 1975 because of the subsequent events in Angola where China and FRELIMO found themselves on opposing sides FRELIMO decided to increase its ties with the Soviet Union. Machel has visited the Soviet Union on various occasions and has signed aid agreements dealing with education, commerce, fishing, air transport, etc. After President Podgorny's visit to Mozambique in April 1977 Machel signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Mozambique has since invoked this treaty in February 1981 after a South African attack on Matola and Soviet warships were sent to Mozambican ports for support. Another significant event in Mozambique-Soviet relations is that Mozambique was one of only three countries in Africa who refused to support the UN resolution condemning the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. [Ref. 79] Thus far, however, Mozambique has refused to give the Soviets base facilities.

Cooperation between Cuba and Mozambique has continued to grow and over 4,000 Mozambicans have been trained in Cuba. Additionally, Cuba is attempting to build Mozambique's fishing and shipping industry. [Ref. 75] Allegedly there were over 1200 Cubans in Mozambique in 1978 (400 technicians and 800 military personnel) and when this figure is added to that of other communist personnel it appears that some 2400 Communist technical and military personnel were in Mozambique during this time. [Ref. 76] Economic and technical agreements were

also signed with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and East Germany which are in keeping with Machel's policy of strengthening alliances with socialist countries.

Relations with the United States have deteriorated over the years and were at an all time low after four U.S. diplomats were expelled in 1981 for being CIA agents. Diplomatic relations were not broken but what small aid was being given was terminated.

Mozambique has begun to foster good relations with Great Britain particularly after the Rhodesian settlement. Mozambique is still most dependent on the Scandianavian countries for developmental aid and is attempting to strengthen this relationship.

Mozambique continues to occupy a critical position in southern Africa because of its geographical location with regards to South Africa. Raids by South African forces have continued since Zimbabwe's independence and in some instances are aimed at sowing instability within Mozambique rather than against ANC guerillas. This coupled with alleged South African support for the RNM has placed Mozambique in a very delicate position. As a result of South African military buildups near the border the Mozambican army has come under scrutiny. The army has been increased to some 24,800 men and new equipment has arrived from the Soviet Union along with advisors from various socialist countries. Current equipment of the Armed Forces appears to be 350 medium tanks (T-34/54/55),

50 light tanks (PT-76), 150 armoured cars (BRDM), 250 armoured personnel carriers (BTR 40/152), assorted howitzers (76-152 mm); BM-21 122 mm rockets, mortars, recoilless rifles; Sagger anti-tank guided weapons; anti-aircraft guns; 24 SAM 6, SA-7 missiles; 9 patrol boats, two squadrons with 36-47 MIG 17/19/21; 4 Alouette and 10 Mi-8 helicopters; and 13 transport aircraft.

Mozambique despite its Marxist government and its opposition to the white-minority-regimes of southern Africa is tied strongly to South Africa by the necessity of economics. Diplomatic relations with South Africa is not possible because of Mozambique's stand against apartheid although commercial attache's and customs and railroad offices remain in operation. Relations between the two countries are based on necessity which has its roots in the pre-colonial economic ties developed and the hope that hostilities in southern Africa will not spread to the Mozambique-South Africa border. Mozambique is destined to be a very important regional player in southern Africa for some time to come.

C. COMOROS

About halfway between the northern tip of Madagascar and the East African coast lie the main islands of the Comoros. The anthropological records of these islands are very scant although the people appear to be African, but with a significant number of Arab features on the northern islands (probably brought over from the coast) and of Malagasy stock on Mayotte.

[Ref. 77] The original settlers probably arrived from the Far East and were of Melano-Polynesian origin but by the 16th century immigrants from the African coast, Madagascar and Persia, as well as Arabs had come to the islands. In the early part of the 16th century the Portuguese, Dutch and French began to arrive and the islands are still not completely integrated. Historically, these islands have served as a link between Madagascar and Africa with Malagasy influence stronger in the southern islands of Mayotte and Moheli. Although there are some degrees of ethnic, linguistic and cultural unity the four islands also have major differences in experience, culture and tradition that often give rise to interisland dispute. Most of the population are Moslem with Arabic and Swahili the principal languages. The French came to Mayotte in 1841 and began their colonization process. One by one the islands were ceded to France until in 1912 Les Comores was proclaimed a colony of France. The islands came under the control of the Governor of Madagascar and because of their separateness and cultural differences were largely ignored by the colonial administration. The traditional social structure on the islands remained in place and the French merely superimposed on it and absorbed the ruling clan into the bureaucratic structure. Whatever development took place was directed for the benefit of French companies or the administrators. Cash crops were undertaken for export by the companies while the population retained their subsistence level existence. During World War

II the islands were occupied by the British. Upon the creation of the French Union in 1946 the Comoros were separated from Madagascar and in 1958 they became a French overseas territory.

Complete autonomy was bestowed on the territory and an elected Chamber of Deputies and Council were established with the President of the Council of Government being the head of the territorial government. The Presidency was held by Said Mohammed Sheikh, a feudal lord, from 1961-1970 when he was succeeded upon his death by Prince Said Ibrahim. A High Commissioner of the French Republic still retained most of the power and four regiments of French soldiers were stationed on the islands to do his bidding. In theory any Comoran could run for office but opposition to the government and France was closely monitored and suppressed. This caused the formation of exile movements led from abroad. Most noteworthy of these was Abdou Boina who formed the Mouvement de Liberation Nationale des Comores (MOLINACO) in 1963 in Dar Es Salaam. On the islands this group began organizing secret cells and was particularly strong among youth in the schools. [Ref. 78]

Traditionally there have been two political parties on the islands - the Comoros Democratic Union (UDC) and the Comoran People's Democratic Rally (RDPC) often referred to as the "greens" and "whites" respectively. The UDC is pro-French and led by Said Ibrahim and the RDPC is an opposition party led by Mohamed Jaffar. Until 1972, both parties pledged to maintain strong ties with France and to secure more French

aid. The coalition between the two parties was destroyed in 1972 when Jaffar publicly demanded independence from France and took over the Presidency of the Council from Ibrahim in June. By September the UDC had joined in the move toward independence and the Chamber of Deputies dissolved. In the election of 1972, the RDPC, the UDC and the Comoros Progress Party (PEC) joined to form a "Union" for the independence of the Comoros which was opposed by Ibrahim's new party, the UMMA which campaigned for independence only with the agreement of France. The "Union" easily defeated the opposition on all of the islands except for Mayotte where 80% were opposed. Ahmed Abdallah the leader of the UDC became President of the Council.

In June 1973, an agreement was signed which would give the Comoros full independence after five years subject to a referendum to be held at that time. Abdallah was made President of the Government and France retained control of foreign affairs, defense and currency, however in December the Deputies voted for independence by 1976. The representatives from the Mayotte People's Movement (MPM) abstained in this vote and it became evident that Mayotte would become a problem. Despite the protests of the Mayotte political leader Henry a referendum was slated for December 1974. The UDC and the RDPC merged to form the Parti pour l'indépendance et l'unité des Comoros (PUIC).

The referendum resulted in a 96 per cent vote in favor of independence except on Mayotte where 64 per cent opposed

it. These results led to much political conflict and on 6 July 1975, the Comoran Deputies voted a unilateral declaration of independence, elected Abdallah as President and called itself a National Assembly. The French did not intervene but retained control of Mayotte. Opposition to Abdallah arose in the form of the United National Front (FNU) which favored a more peaceful policy towards Mayotte and less personal power for Abdallah. On 3 August the FNU staged a coup and Abdallah was overthrown and a National Executive Council formed under Jaffar and Ali Soilih, who led the coup, became Defence Minister.

The MPM began to expell all non-Mahorais from Mayotte and on 12 November the Comoros were admitted to the U.N. as a unified state consisting of the entire island archipelago. The admission was not opposed by France but France continued her plans for a separate referendum on Mayotte. Angered by this the Executive Council nationalized all French administrative property on the islands and dismissed all French officials. France formally recognized the independence of Grande-Comore, Anjouan and Moheli but relations between the countries ceased. In January 1976, Ali Soilih was elected Head of State and he set about the task of creating a constitutional system that would hopefully win back Mayotte.

Mayotte held its referendum in February 1976 and voted to retain its link with France and through complicated legal maneuvers it now finds itself a collectivite territoriale or somewhere between a department and a territory in the French scheme of things.

Outraged by this the Comoros began a very vindictive campaign to erase all records of French administration. The civil service was abolished along with various ministries and the government reorganized. In May 1977, the Comoros was proclaimed a "democratic, secular, socialist republic" centered around a new local administration based on the moudira (small self-sufficient units comprising a population of about 6,000). The structure of the revolution blended Maoism and Islam but was unique in that it created new ruling groups called moudirs comprised of local chiefs and students. Students and youths became Soilih's supporters and were given administrative positions. The voting age was lowered to 14 and the redistribution of land was to take place, however the revolution found few willing adherents outside of the moudirs. Unfortunately, none of Soilih's reforms brought any semblance of stability, and his attempts to change traditional religious life were deeply resented, and only added to the frustrations experienced by crop failure, drought and food shortage.

On 12 May 1978, President Soilih was overthrown by a coup (and subsequently shot and killed) and a new "political-military directorate" led by President Ahmed Abdallah, who had been in exile since being deposed in 1975 by Soilih, took over. Robert Denard, a French mercenary led the 50-man commando unit that landed to carry out the relatively bloodless coup.

[Ref. 79] African nations were frightened by the coup and the Comoros delegation was expelled from the OAU. Denard

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
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served briefly as commander of the Comorian armed forces and as a member of the directorate but left the islands on 28 September in order to enable the Comoros to regain its rightful place in the "concert of nations". [Ref. 80] Diplomatic relations with France had been re-established after the coup as had the resumption of French economic and military cooperation. Other countries soon joined in and aid was received from Arab countries, the EEC and the African Development Fund. In February 1979, the Comoros was readmitted to the OAU.

On 1 October 1978, the electorate voted in favor of the islands becoming an Islamic Federal Republic and on 22 October Abdallah was elected President. [Ref. 81] The new republic comprises a Presidency, a Council of Government, a Federal Assembly, the Supreme Court and an elected Governor for each island thereby giving the islands some autonomy.

Abdallah has been trying to clean house since the ouster of Soilih and rebuild the country. Major links have been reforged to the Western and Arab worlds from which aid and technical assistance must come for modernization of the society. A large but still disunited opposition in exile is a serious concern not only because of the threat to the regime but for the source of embarrassment it causes to be focused on the issue of political prisoners. The defection of one of his ambassadors was a serious blow to the Abdallah government and a boost to the opposition. In addition to cruel treatment of his opposition Abdallah has been accused of governing by corrupt means with incompetent officials who are his friends.

Mayotte still poses a problem to the Comorian administration and it must proceed cautiously. French and Western aid is vital to the economy of the islands and Mayotte has become a strategic base for the French in the Indian Ocean. A 1979 bilateral military agreement between France and the Comoros has brought the Comoros under the wing of French military protection. The local army consists of about 1,000 men and French military instructors and soldiers are said to number about 400.

Regionally, the Comoros has found that its neighbors are remaining distant. Because of Tanzania's traditional role as a training ground for revolutionaries and as a haven for political exiles Abdallah has kept trade and transportation links to a minimum. Madagascar has refused to resume the normally close relations it has had with the islands, and the Seychelles and Mozambique are also playing it cautious. Abdallah has attempted to strengthen ties with Arab countries by stressing the island's Arab background and Islamic religion. This has caused Abdallah to support the Kuwaiti line on Palestinian and Middle Eastern issues. [Ref. 82]

D. MAURITIUS

Mauritius inherited from its colonial past a series of political problems. Originally utilized by Arabs and Malays as a place of shelter it was "discovered" by the Portuguese in the 16th century. In the 17th century the Dutch attempted to create settlements on the island. The first permanent settlers

were French; they claimed the island in 1715, calling it "Ile de France." The name Mauritius comes from the Dutch who had named it after Prince Maurice. The French brought slaves with them from Africa and Madagascar to work their sugar plantations and currently these Creole descendants of mixed African-European parentage comprise a little over one quarter of the Mauritian population. Mauritius was captured by the British in 1810 and it was placed under British rule after the Treaty of Paris in 1814 along with the Seychelles, the Chagos islands and Rodrigues. It remained a British colony for a century-and-half. The French inhabitants were allowed to keep their language, culture and legal system. The abolition of slavery in the British colonies in 1833 forced the planters to turn to India for indentured laborers and by 1861 it is estimated that two-thirds of the population was Indian.

The first Council of Government in Mauritius was established in 1825 due to demands made by the planter and merchant elites. Elections were held every five years under strict franchise laws which are designed to maintain the position of the elite. The Indians were kept out of the political system. The island's first political party, the Mauritius Labor Party, established in 1936 by a Creole doctor, was based on the model of the British Labor Party. Rioting occurred in 1937 as a result of labor grievances and in 1945 the constitution was revised. This revision promulgated in 1947 provided for a Legislative Council of elected, nominated and official members. Suffrage was extended to all over 21 who could prove they could write a sentence in any language.

The constitutional revision created a dramatic change in Mauritian politics as the Indian majority was sure to remove control from the Franco-Mauritians. The results of a general election in 1948 gave 10 seats in the council to Indians, 7 to Creoles and only 1 to a Franco-Mauritian. The Indian community continued to build on its power base and an Indian doctor, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, became the leader of the Labor Party. The Labor Party maintained an alliance with the Creole laborers and the Indians. Constitutional changes and a limit on the power of the government were among the demands championed by the Labor Party along with the introduction of a ministerial system. A new constitution in 1959 extended suffrage and Mauritius headed steadily towards independence. It was during this time that two new parties were formed called the Independent Forward Bloc and the Muslim Committee of Action (CAM). The former was a Hindu party with its base in the rural community while the latter was an attempt to improve the position of the Muslims. The party of the Franco-Mauritian and Creole elite initially called the Ralliement Mauricien later became the Parti Mauricien (PM) and further evolved into its present form the Parti Mauricien Social Democrate (PMSD) under Charles Duval. At a conference in London in 1961 it was decided to approve self-government for the island.

Opposition to the Labor Party and independence was beginning to mount by those who feared Indian domination. Violence began to erupt in 1965 and this combined with a break in the political

alliance between the Labor Party and the PM. The PM favored an "association" with Britain and was against independence whereas most of the other parties favored independence and formed the Independence Party. The end result was that on 12 March 1968 Mauritius gained its independence and Ramgoolam, the head of the Labor Party, became the first Prime Minister. Mauritius is still a member of the British Commonwealth. It has a parliamentary government which is headed by a Prime Minister and supported by a Legislative Assembly with a Council of Ministers and a constitution.

Since independence, opposition to the government from the Mouvement Militant Mauricienne (MMM) organized under Paul Berenger, the son of one of the elite Franco-Mauritian planters, in 1969 has increased. Berenger's MMM has been able to ally the youth of Mauritius against the government. Solidifying himself among the youth he then turned to the organization of trade unions and by 1971 he had successfully gained control of the island's major transport and dock worker unions. Strikes broke out and a State of Emergency was declared in 1971 and many MMM supporters were arrested. Dissension soon overtook the MMM and it had small groups split off.

In 1973, the coalition of Labor and the PM split and Duval left the government because of a dispute with Prime Minister Ramgoolam over potential French basing rights in Mauritius. General elections were held in December 1976 with the Independence Party and the PM both campaigning against the

MMM on the grounds that the latter was communist. The MMM program called for the formation of a republic with a token president, a partial nationalization, an anti-South African stand, and the return of Diego Garcia and Tromelin to Mauritius. The results of this election proved surprising as the MMM staged an upset in winning 34 seats in parliament as opposed to 27 for the Independence Party, 8 for the PM and 1 for the CAM. It was only because of Ramgoolam's hasty formation of a coalition with the PM that Berenger was prevented from forming a government. This coalition has managed to retain power but now faces a very crucial test in the upcoming elections.

The election scheduled for 11 June 1982 appears to be a choice between the currently ruling pro-Western Labor Party and Social Democratic Party coalition under the control of Ramgoolam or the socialist MMM and Mauritian Socialist Party (PSM) coalition under Berenger. [Ref. 83] Caste plays an important role in Mauritian politics particularly within the Labor Party where the Hindu's have become extremely caste-conscious and it may be the determining factor in the election.

The Labor Party wants to follow a more leftist policy and has said that capitalism must be eliminated and the basic principles of democratic socialism need to be reaffirmed. The party is attempting to mobilize the people and to provide them information. In foreign affairs the party is encouraging

disarmament, supporting non-alignment and maintaining good relations with Indian Ocean countries, reclaiming Diego Garcia, urging demilitarization in the Indian Ocean, recognizing the PLO and supporting the New International Economic Order.

The Diego Garcia problem is one of great interest to most of the people of Mauritius. Ramgoolam has often been accused of selling out the country in disposing of the island in 1965 while he claims that he had no other choice if Mauritius was to be granted independence. After making many vigorous demands for the return of Diego Garcia and receiving support from the OAU, Ramgoolam in November 1980, addressed the U.N. demanding the return of the island but in a later interview said that the U.S. should negotiate directly with Mauritius for the use of the island. [Ref. 84] The MMM agrees with Ramgoolam on the return of Diego Garcia and both support the zone of peace concept calling for the removal of all foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean. The MMM and Labor see Diego Garcia as an excuse for the Soviets to increase their military presence in the area but unlike Berenger, Ramgoolam insists that military withdrawal not be limited to the U.S. It is anticipated that the status of Diego Garcia will play a major role in the upcoming election and in most quarters a Ramgoolam victory is seen as a victory for the West.

The Ramgoolam government is also under a crossfire on the issue of South African relations. Mauritius has a strong

trade link with that nation much to the displeasure of the MMM while Duval of the PMSD urges a stronger link in the economic and commercial areas. Consistent with OAU resolutions, Mauritius has not established diplomatic relations with South Africa. In an apparent turn, Mauritius did not answer the roll-call in the U.N. on 7 November 1980 after a debate on sanctions against South Africa although on previous occasions they had given full support. Mauritius has become increasingly dependent on South Africa in the tourist industry as well as the sugar and tea export industries while importing more and more food from South Africa. Another point of contention is the proposal to build an oil refinery on the island that supposedly exceeds the requirements of the country and leads some of the opposition to believe that the excess will be sold to South Africa. [Ref. 85]

Mauritius has had its share of bloodshed, civil disorders and enactment of emergency powers throughout its history. Strikes and riots are common. Ethnocentric communities remain hostile to this day and sugar still dominates the economy however foreign affairs which are vital to the islands trade economy have been misleading. [Ref. 86] Mauritius' role in international affairs is very complex due to its geographical position, its economic situation and its close ties with Britain. Because of its membership in organizations like the U.N., the Commonwealth, OCAM, the Francophone community, the EEC, the East African Community and a myriad

of international associations as well as the OAU Mauritius has been able to play an important part in international affairs. Mauritian leaders have at one time or another dealt with China, India, Egypt, Tanzania, France, Israel, Japan, South Africa, African liberation movements, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

In late 1970, the Soviet Union was granted refueling and docking rights for Soviet fishing vessels as well as landing rights for Aeroflot planes transporting crews for the vessels. This agreement to provide trawler facilities at Port Louis formalized previous relations and specified what the Soviet vessels could and could not do in return for Soviet fishery equipment and technical assistance. This agreement set the stage for an outcry that Mauritius gave the Soviet's strategic concessions. [Ref. 87] Many feel that the presence of Soviet trawlers foreshadows that of the fleet. According to Robert Hanks initially the fishing craft put in to Port Louis for fuel, rest and supplies, however, the Soviet Navy was not far behind, and today the Soviet flag is a familiar sight in and around this strategically located port. [Ref. 88] The Soviet navy has mooring buoys off the Seychelles, off Mauritius and in the Chagos Archipelago as well as Socotra; Port Louis is used for fleet supply purposes. [Ref. 89] It appears that an MMM victory could play into the Soviet's hands and lead to a denial of Western naval access to Port Louis, more pressure for the U.S. to withdraw from Diego Garcia, and

the development of an anti-Western coalition composed of Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar in the Western Indian Ocean. [Ref. 90] The Soviet Union is proceeding cautiously as it does not desire to alienate the current regime and jeopardize its current position. This approach does not prevent them from encouraging Libyan support for the MMM. The Libyans along with the Seychelles have been funneling financial assistance to the MMM mainly through an Islamic Cultural Center established by the Libyans. Despite Qaddafi's connection with Berenger no one is sure to what extent he will be able to influence a new government. [Ref. 91]] Libyan funding has caused Ramgoolam to depart from his former policy on the Middle East and relations were broken with Israel, the Middle East Peace settlement denounced, and the PLO recognized.

The U.S. is in a difficult position because of Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. In an attempt to provide some financial assistance to the ruling coalition and offset the Libyan backing of the MMM the U.S. government decided to hire Mauritian workers for use on Diego Garcia. Unfortunately U.S. aid has continued to diminish and there is no developmental assistance funds for Mauritius in 1982. U.S. naval vessels frequent the island in an effort to maintain a U.S. presence in the area and to expand contacts between American and Mauritian nationals.

Mauritius is another key crossroad in the Indian Ocean where Soviet and U.S. naval forces are building up because

of the instability in Iran and Afghanistan [Ref. 92] and the upcoming election will greatly influence the outcome of superpower strategy in the area.

E. SEYCHELLES

The uninhabited Seychelles were probably known and frequented by traders from Arabia and the Persian Gulf region during the Middle Ages long before the first reported Portuguese sighting in 1502. The exploration of the islands in 1742 was prompted by the French governor of Mauritius and France claimed possession in 1756. The islands remained uninhabited for the next twelve years at which time French planters imported African slaves in order to undertake the creation of fruit and copra plantations and to harvest the available timber. During the Napoleonic Wars French vessels operated out of the Seychelles harassing English shipping until the island surrendered to the captain of an English vessel after a successful blockade in 1794. The administration of the island under the French continued until 1810 and the Treaty of Paris signed in 1814 formally ceded the Seychelles and Mauritius to England.

These two islands became English colonies and were administered as a single entity by a commissioner appointed from Mauritius. The islanders were allowed to retain their French language and customs and this explains the large French cultural influence found on the islands today. French

remains one of the islands' official languages the other being English. Approximately 90 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. The first steps to separate the two island colonies were taken in 1872 and in 1888 an order was passed providing the Seychelles with an Administrator and a nominated council. By 1897, the Administrator had attained the powers of Governor and in 1903, the separation of Mauritius and the Seychelles was completed and the Seychelles became a Crown Colony.

French emigration to the Seychelles had continued until slavery was abolished by the British in 1833. The inter-marriage of the predominately French settlers and the now freed slaves led to the development of a nearly homogenous creole society in contrast to that of Mauritius where a larger number of Indian laborers were imported. Chinese merchants came to the Seychelles in order to take advantage of the island's commercial potential but they along with the Indians are a small minority (about 1% of the total population).

Political parties developed in the colony and in 1963 for the first time elections were undertaken along party lines. In stark contrast to Mauritius the parties in the Seychelles were constructed along class lines rather than ethnic groupings. By 1964, the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP) under James Mancham and the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP) under France Rene were the predominant actors on the political scene. Mancham was from a wealthy Chinese

background and claimed the allegiance of the wealthy island elite. He advocated free enterprise and a close association with England and is considered politically right of center. Rene, a decendent of a white settler on the island, has his strength in the trade unionists, and intellectuals while appealing to many of the lower class. Politically he leans to the left.

In 1970, the English agreed to a plan to establish a ministerial system on the islands and opposed a plan by Mancham for integration with England. By this time the United Nations was calling for a transfer of power to elected representatives of the islanders, a closing of the gap between the rich and the poor, and a system to prevent foreign economic interests from taking over the area.

The 1967 elections had given the SDP four seats in the Legislative Council as opposed to three for the SPUP. The Council was expanded to 15 members in 1970 and in the election of that year the SDP won 10 seats on an integration platform while the SPUP won five seats on an independence platform. Mancham became the Chief Minister but the OAU supported the socialist oriented Rene in his quest for independence. In 1973, Mancham announced that he would ask for internal self-government but in a major political shift just prior to the 1974 elections he campaigned for independence rather than integration. In the controversial elections of 1974, the SDP received 53% of the popular vote and 13 seats while the

SPUP polled 48% of the votes but only received 2 seats. [Ref. 93] Obviously the SPUP claimed that the election was unfair. A coalition government was formed in June 1975 in order to prepare for independence in 1976. In order to rectify part of the discrepancy resulting from the 1974 election the Legislative Assembly was increased in size to twenty-five with each party receiving five additional seats. A Cabinet of Ministers was formed with eight members from the SDP and four from the SPUP with Mancham as Prime Minister. The coalition operated smoothly on the surface but the political separation between the two parties continued to widen.

The Constitutional Conference of January 1976 agreed on independence and a constitution to take effect on 29 June 1976. At this time the Legislative Assembly was renamed the National Assembly, Mancham became the President and Rene the Prime Minister. It was anticipated that the coalition government would remain in office until the elections of 1979. The islands of Desroches, Farquhar and Aldabra which had been separated from the Seychelles to form the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) in 1965 were returned to the Seychelles at independence.

Just 342 days after achieving independence the Republic of the Seychelles experienced a coup. While attending a meeting in London President Mancham was deposed by 60 armed Rene supporters who allegedly received arms and training in Tanzania. Rene claimed that he had no prior knowledge of

the plot however Jacques Hodoul who led the coup became the Minister of Education and Culture in Rene's new government. [Ref. 94] Rene became President, suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and expelled some English police officers. Noticing the ease in which Mancham's government fell Rene undertook the formation of an army and a security force to defend his regime. On 2 July 1978, 18 tons of small arms were flown to the island by an Air Algerie transport complete with an Algerian colonel. There were enough arms in this shipment to provide one out of every four men on the island with an AK47 Kalashnikov. [Ref. 95] The fear of a countercoup appears to be well-founded as the government has reported at least one attempted coup per year since 1977. [Ref. 96] Rene ruled the country by decree until June 1979 when a new constitution was proclaimed which made the Seychelles a one-party state. Mancham remained in London and is banned from returning to the islands. In June 1978, the SPUP was renamed the Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF) and became the only political party on the islands.

President Rene pledged that his government would be "based on some system of socialism which we can evolve for the Seychelles." He has maintained a mixed economy and there has been no widespread nationalization or appropriation of land or industry and the tourist industry is still almost completely in private control. [Ref. 97] The government's

socialist philosophy has lead to increased opposition by the small middle class.

Under the June 1979 Constitution the President is Head-of-State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and serves for five years. His successor is nominated by the national congress of the SPPF and the voters are given a simple choice of voting yes or no. The President picks his own Ministers which are then subject to ratification by a People's Assembly. The Council of Ministers advises the President. The Assembly has 23 elected members representing the Inner Islands and two appointees of the President representing the Outer Islands. Rene won the election of 1979. [Ref. 98] Many changes were made in the Constitution with regards to strengthening the position of the SPPF and making it "the vanguard party" of the socialist revolution. Opposition became so severe over the proposal for compulsory National Youth Service (NYS) that schools were closed. The government finally agreed to start the program on a voluntary basis in 1981 and the first youth village opened in that year. According to the government another coup attempt was foiled in November 1979 involving mercenaries from South Africa. Many people were detained and when they were released quickly left the country. The large number of politically dissatisfied individuals residing outside of the country is of great concern to Rene and Mancham still poses a viable threat. The latest coup of 25 November 1981 places further emphasis on this point.

It was Rene's attention to the formation of the Seychelles Liberation Army, People's Militia and security forces that saved his regime in November 1981. The defense forces are small with the Army numbering some 900 men in three infantry companies, the Militia with about 1,500 men, a 550 man police force and a small naval force. Most of the training has been done by Tanzanian instructors and the force is equipped with small arms, armored and light artillery primarily of Soviet manufacture. [Ref. 99] The Tanzanians were gradually being withdrawn at the time of the coup but now their number has been increased to 400. [Ref. 100] After the 1981 coup attempt, Rene requested French military training for the defense force and French maritime reconnaissance of the islands sea and airspace. The British have also received inquiries on future arms sales. [Ref. 10]

The Seychelles is a member of the Commonwealth, OCAM and the OAU. It conducts a foreign policy of "positive non-alignment" with the superpowers while strengthening its identification with Africa and other Third World countries. According to a UN Ambassador, the Seychelles, "minute as they may be...have a paramount role to play in international affairs from within our world organization, particularly in the best interests of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace free from great power rivalry." [Ref. 102] President Rene is one of the most staunch advocates of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace

and demilitarization of the BIOT. In a February 1980 meeting the SPPF called for the removal of all foreign bases in the Indian Ocean. Rene is strongly against the U.S. base on Diego Garcia. Warships of all navies are permitted routine port visits to the islands as long as they certify that they are not carrying nuclear weapons. The Seychelles government will not allow any country to establish base facilities in the islands.

The Soviet Union has been attempting to cultivate friendly relations with the Seychelles. Soviet diplomats have begun a campaign of "ruthless friendship" toward the government in pursuit of strategic goals to have a base astride the main tanker route for oil destined to Western Europe and North America. A Soviet presence in the islands would act as a counterweight to the establishment of U.S. facilities at Mombasa Kenya. [Ref. 103] Within four days of the attempted coup in November 1981 a Soviet cruiser and destroyer anchored off of Victoria in a show of solidarity and an Alligator-class vessel arrived a few days later. [Ref. 104] Moscow has no economic aid program with the Seychelles and commercial trade is minimal but in October 1981 it presented a patrol vessel to the government. An accord also was signed to set up an astronomy observatory on the islands. [Ref. 105] The Soviets appear to have an advantage in the Seychelles with the largest diplomatic representation of any nation, a common bond of socialism, and the ability to provide security to a troubled regime.

Relations with the U.S. is on the increase with a renegotiated lease on a U.S. space tracking station that runs until 1990 (the station was originally built in 1963). The monetary benefit from the lease of this facility combined with the money spent by the personnel manning the station is very important to the economy of the islands. U.S. economic assistance to the islands has greatly increased in the past few years and currently totals about \$3 million. Assistance in food crop development and agricultural feeder road construction has been undertaken and there are approximately 15 Peace Corps volunteers in the islands. All U.S. personnel have made major efforts to cement good relations and improve the U.S. position in the islands. U.S. interests in the Seychelles appear to focus on softening the Soviet efforts to strengthen their relationship with the government and the prevention of Soviet base facilities in the area.

President Rene has expanded contacts with Third World countries in an effort to remain independent of the superpowers. The English and French had provided most of the financial assistance but they are slowly being replaced by Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Libya and India as well as a host of international organizations. To avoid identification with the Soviet Union the Seychelles has built ties with North Korea, China and Yugoslavia and has recognized/established diplomatic relations with the Kampuchea Revolutionary Council [Ref. 106], the Maldives [Ref. 107], Vietnam, Albania and the

Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (whose membership in the OAU Rene strongly supports). [Ref. 108]

Within the Western Indian Ocean region the Seychelles has often been at odds with Mauritius. This apparently goes back to the coup in 1977 when Rene came to power and Ramgoolam described him and his followers as a "group of gangsters." The Seychelles are also distressed over the statement that if Britain returns Diego Garcia to Mauritius the government of Mauritius would lease it to the U.S. for defensive purposes. Differences of opinion have also surfaced at the International Whaling Commission conference where the Seychelles finds itself opposed by Mauritius, Kenya and Tanzania regarding a sanctuary for whales. Mauritius has accused the Seychelles of attempting to destabilize and overthrow the current regime by financing the Marxist opposition party, MMM, which has vowed to remove Ramgoolam from power. [Ref. 109] In March 1981, a Seychelles tuna boat was illegally boarded in Mauritius by paramilitary commandoes which only served to deteriorate relations between the two countries. [Ref. 110] In compliance with the OAU and in order to strengthen the country's African identity, Rene takes a strong stand condemning South Africa for its policies on Namibia and apartheid. South African Airlines flights were terminated in 1980 although South African tourists still may enter the country on Royal Swazi Airlines. As a point of interest the mercenaries taking part in the abortive coup of November 1981 entered as a

visiting rugby team on this airline. [Ref. 111] Rene frequently focuses his attack on the close commercial ties between South Africa and Mauritius and recently loaned \$3 million to that island country to aid the sagging tea industry. [Ref. 112] In an effort to retain and forge stronger links with countries of the Western Indian Ocean the Seychelles have turned to Madagascar and Tanzania. Beginning in 1979 Tanzania, Madagascar and the Seychelles held joint military maneuvers in the Seychelles including naval forces. Maritime agreements were signed between the countries. [Ref. 113] Special relationships have since developed between these countries which in the case of Tanzania date back to the coup of 1977.

While it is true that Rene's socialist policies and rhetoric have antagonized many of the island's populace it is very difficult to ascertain the true extent of his support. Many have fled into exile and the resurgence of democracy or the resurrection of Mancham are distinct possibilities. The threats inside and outside the country have forced Rene to increase his security forces and he does not have the financial backing to undertake this endeavor along with increased social services.

IV. U.S. POLICY IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN

A. OBJECTIVES

The events that have taken place in the WIO and Mozambique in the 1970's have drastically altered the economic, political and military situation in the area and indicate the possibility of more change in the future. It is clear that this area is becoming more important to U.S. interests and that the United States should give it the attention it deserves. As a bloc, African nations now account for almost a third of the membership of the United Nations. This formidable voting power in the U.N. in association with the voting power of other non-aligned nations in the world, gives the African states considerable political clout in the international arena. In this context of Third World politics, we should also realize that this area lying between the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, holds a unique geographical position between the East and the West. [Ref. 114]

The concern with U.S. interests of a security or strategic nature in the area is focused almost entirely on the vulnerability of Western shipping lanes in the IO and around the Cape of Good Hope. Thus access by the Soviets to bases in the area is often viewed with alarm as providing the Soviets the means to blockade or interdict these routes. The political turmoil in the area as well as in southern

Africa has increased concerns about the security of the Cape Oil Route. It is a common belief among conservatives that radical regimes coming into power with the aid of the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries will be so under the power of Soviet influence that they will automatically allow their ports and air facilities to be used as bases for Soviet operations against the West.

The United State's objectives in the WIO are extremely complex, diverse and multifaceted. For the purpose of this paper I will borrow a page from Robert Legvold and break objectives down into four categories: 1) defensive national concerns, 2) defensive strategic concerns, 3) offensive national concerns and 4) offensive strategic concerns.

[Ref. 115]

1. Defensive National Concerns

The United States feels that it has an interest in the stability and economic development of the countries in the area and that instability, conflicts between regional powers, and a major change in the local balance of power would serve the interests of the Soviet Union or China and therefore would tilt the world military balance in its disfavor. [Ref. 116] In other words, it is in our interest to maintain the status quo or to change it in favor of "allies" or "friends" of the United States and to deny further Soviet expansion.

2. Defensive Strategic Concerns

The United States has an interest in maintaining the freedom of the seas, not only on the high seas but in international straits or channels as well. While the protection of the sea lanes and the vital Cape Oil Route is less vital to the United States than to the Europeans it must be remembered that somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 per cent of world shipping travels through the IO. The core of this objective is the trade route. Additionally, the U.S. is concerned with monitoring and coping with Soviet naval movements in the area and averting the expansion of Soviet bases/facilities in the WIO particularly in or about the trade route.

Soviet warships in the IO are suspected of being there in potential readiness to interdict shipping which is essential for the transportation of oil and strategic minerals to Europe and the United States. The narrow waters through which such shipping has to pass such as the Suez Canal and the Straits of Hormuz or the Cape of Good Hope are often mentioned as "choke-points" for these operations. Also the Soviet IO squadron is in a position to support "national liberation movements" or friendly littoral states in the IO against foreign intervention, i.e. movement of Soviet warships into Mozambican ports after South African air attacks. Another factor which must be considered is that the Soviet Navy must be in a position to protect Eastern Bloc merchant-shipping and fishing fleets which are growing each year.

3. Offensive National Concerns

This objective centers around the U.S.'s ability to project political influence, increase economic relations, and stability in the area by increasing its ties with countries in the area and wooing them over to the Western way.

The threat to U.S. "credibility" by Soviet advances in the area constitutes a significant challenge to U.S. interests, influence and desires in the area and must be countered by an aggressive U.S. policy. The communication of U.S. values is a means of confronting anti-Western ideologies and it is necessary for the U.S. to put forth its views of the future and to show the resolve to achieve these goals. We must restate the need to minimize military competition in the area and pursue political and economic alternatives.

4. Offensive Strategic Concerns

For mainly strategic reasons the U.S. may want to use the WIO as a patrol area or as a launching area for submarines carrying ballistic missiles. Additionally it must be remembered that the Soviet Navy has been traditionally divided into four separate fleets (the Arctic, the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Pacific) and they must maintain a positive connection between the three European fleets and the Pacific Fleet through the Indian Ocean. Large Soviet combatants are not constructed at Vladivostok but rather in Europe and must be sent to the Pacific either through the

Suez Canal or via the Cape route. These sea communications are very important to the Soviet Union as they represent the only ice-free sea-route linking the Soviet ports in the Black and Azov seas with those in the Far East. The U.S. must maintain a position in the WIO from which it is capable of monitoring and interdicting Soviet naval movements.

B. OPTIONS

In organizing this section into available policy options for the United States to pursue in the Western Indian Ocean certain options presented by Helen Kitchen in Options for U.S. Policy Toward Africa [Ref. 117] have been modified and consolidated into four options. The four options are:

1) confrontation/geostrategic 2) do nothing or "no policy" policy 3) concern for credibility and 4) tempered idealism. It is not the contention of this paper that the four options presented are the only ones available but that they are the most prominent ones. They adequately portray the wide range of values and positions present in U.S. society.

The order in which the options appear in the text are not intended to convey any significance as to their credibility or popularity. Each option is merely a way of looking at the United State's actions in the Western Indian Ocean based on certain perspectives and premises. As in any area of foreign policy the boundaries of various options are not clearly delineated and they tend to overlap and merge.

1. Confrontation/Geostrategic [Ref. 118]

This option calls for the United States to confront the Soviets, Chinese or Eastern Bloc wherever they are active in the WIO utilizing the full gambit of available instruments. According to this view the Soviet Union is an expansionist and opportunist minded power that will use whatever force is necessary to gain influence in the WIO including military, political and economic leverage. Any Soviet or Communist gain is perceived as a U.S. loss, and the U.S. must mobilize to meet/counter the threat.

In the words of Eugene Rostow, "The notion that Soviet-American relations have improved in recent years, that the cold war is over, that negotiations have been substituted for confrontation" is a "figment of President Nixon's political imagination" carried forward by his successors. The fact is that the cold war is not over and that current Soviet thrusts are worse than before. What is occurring in the WIO and in Africa is part of an integral struggle on the part of the Soviets for worldwide expansion.

One of the major premises of this option is that the spirit of competition is a permanent feature between the United States and the Soviet Union. Due to a myriad of reasons the current arena of competition has shifted to the Third World and the WIO is now considered within the sphere of operations in the Soviet Union's campaign to extend its influence into areas of the world that have been historically within the Western sphere of influence.

The main goals of the Soviet Union are perceived to be the following: to prevent China from expanding its influence in the world; to establish relationships with countries that would eliminate/reduce the current logistical problems encountered by the Soviets in maintaining a "blue water navy" in the WIO; to establish the right for the Soviet Union to participate on an equal basis with the United States on any deliberations (political, economic or military) affecting the area; and to undermine Western influence whenever and wherever the opportunity presents itself.

A United States WIO policy constructed with the above goals in mind would include: primary attention to U.S./ Western strategic interests (elimination of the capability of the Soviets to disrupt sea lanes); recognition of the fact that the United Nations often does not act in our best interest and it is time that we gave up trying to placate the U.N.; reaffirmation of the policy that the U.S. military presence in the IO is perfectly legitimate and in keeping with the principal of freedom of navigation on the high seas; a statement that external intervention in the area should be opposed; and a clause that requests for external assistance from countries with historical connections to the area would be considered in a less antagonistic light than requests or offers of help from outsiders.

To undertake such a strategy of confrontation would involve a high level of material and political commitment by

the United States. A major material and diplomatic outlay is a vital necessity to the success of this policy. Military and economic aid would have to be greatly increased and broadened.

Proponents of this policy would advocate aggressive development and confrontation with the Soviet Union in the area. Soviet intervention in the area would be publicly condemned and the U.S. would have to emphasize that it is willing to assist any country in the area should they feel threatened by the Soviet Union or her proxy. Any or all of the tools available to the United States could be utilized to maintain stability.

2. Do Nothing or "No Policy" Policy [Ref. 119]

It is not beyond the realm of comprehension to consider a policy of "no policy" toward the WIO. Criticism of U.S. interventionism and political pressure might become so intense that the current administration or the administration in control could possibly feel that in their judgement the national interest at stake in the WIO is not sufficient enough to warrant the political, economic or military maneuvers that would be involved in a relationship in the area.

A "no policy" policy appeals to many different groups along the American political spectrum. Foremost among these would be those in the academic community who are to the left of the center and opposed to virtually almost any

activity of the United States government or multinational corporations based in the United States in any area of the world. This group opposes what they perceive to be the United States government's purpose in the area. Some advocates of disengagement rely on the vision that the area itself will seize the initiative in eliminating all external powers (i.e. the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace). The area should close itself off from the outside world and allow its own intra-area forces to run their course. Whether the area comes out socialist, capitalist, or democratic is not important but what is important is that it works out the problem for itself. Others of the "no policy" persuasion have reached the conclusion that the WIO area is so weak, unstable and unreliable that the United States should refrain from interfering or helping the area shape its destiny.

An administration choosing this course of action would have to have determined that the WIO is of no strategic importance and that the internal political affairs of the area are not of enough concern for the United States to warrant the United States seeking involvement in the area.

The objectives of the "no policy" policy would be to disassociate the United States from any responsibility for how the area works out its political destiny and to remove the threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union in an area where our national interests are of only at best minor concern.

The unique feature of this option is that there would be no binding relationships with any of the countries. There would be no attempts to build up or destroy governments, no pressure to outmaneuver the Cubans or Chinese or Soviets, and no strong arming of allies to do our bidding in the area. We would completely disenfranchise ourselves from the area, relying on the hope that our vastly superior system of economy and society will eventually inspire emulation by the other nations of the world.

No U.S. government intervention in political affairs of the area would be tolerated and the only acceptable form of intervention would be for strictly humanitarian matters. The implementation of this policy would mean an overall reduction in the American profile in the area. Military planners would not base any of their plans on the present or future access to ports or airfields in the WIO and any bilateral aid would cease.

One of the disadvantages of this policy depends upon the value attached to being a superpower. Can the United States as a superpower ignore this area or for that matter any area or would it be an abdication of the responsibility of a superpower? Another danger is that in effect we are sending a message to an area of the world and telling them that they don't count for anything so we'd rather have nothing to do with them. This could have profound repercussions in the future in this area and in other areas of the world where stature would be diminished considerably.

3. Concern for Credibility [Ref. 120]

The proponents of this option would advocate a pragmatic and activist stand based on a fine blend of United States global and regional interests. The WIO would be viewed as an integral part of the global system. The area would be recognized as an area of growing interest for the United States and the West. The areas new role as an arena for superpower competition and conflict as well as its strategic location in relation to the Middle East and the Cape Oil Route is of increasing importance.

The primary objectives of this option would be to help the countries of the area to achieve a level of stability, secure vital sea lines of communication for use by the West, to respond to concerns about the loss of U.S. resolve after Vietnam and the resulting aimless responses to Soviet challenges in the area, and to make it absolutely clear that noninvolvement of a Western power is not the route to counter the threat to the area.

In order to carry out this policy, one would have to include active diplomacy at all levels (not just talks and visits), diplomatic initiatives, economic and military aid on a much greater scale than at present, positive governmental incentives, and the possibility of military intervention cannot be ruled out but rather must be utilized as a viable source of action. An attempt must be undertaken to portray the Soviet aims and methods for what they really are and to

emphasize their military nature. Bilateral economic and development aid would be greatly expanded without overbearing conditions being placed on the countries receiving/requesting the aid. Military aid and sales would increase and the U.S. would not back away from providing military assistance when requested by a friendly state.

4. Tempered Idealism [Ref. 121]

This option emphasizes diplomatic skill rather than strategic means. The primary objective is to minimize conflict and violence in whatever changes take place by reducing the external military component. Patience and negotiations are the watchwords for this policy.

Among the priorities of this option are an emphasis on continued negotiations to resolve differences rather than resorting to force to determine the outcome. Other priorities include convincing the countries of the WIO that increased political and economic cooperation with the United States and the West are in their best interest as well as ours; that a reduction in the flow of arms into the area will increase stability; that the countries of the area should seek regional solutions to regional problems and they should not call upon external powers to exert influence in the area; regional institutions should be created or strengthened to provide for economic development and the peaceful arbitration of local disputes. The United States role in the area would be merely supportive and not aggressive.

The chief assets for implementing this policy are a very patient diplomacy, which is characterized by an endless ability to prolong the discussion process; a joint United States and Western/WIO approach to the problems of the area; and a reassessment of economic and military assistance to the area.

While some proponents of this option are thinking along the lines of a Marshall Plan in order to meet the development needs of the area this view is tempered by recognition of the fact that any economic aid likely to be distributed by Congress would not significantly reduce the basic economic problems in the WIO area. Multilateral not unilateral economic aid is the solution to the economic problems primarily through the World Bank and other international agencies. U.S. and other Western aid must focus on key areas which should include infrastructure development, education, management training programs, industrial/technological development, and increased agricultural efficiency.

U.S. security assistance would be limited; and judicious restrictions will be placed on the type of equipments transferred as well as the amounts and recipient countries. Whenever possible the countries of the WIO will be urged to seek Western European sources rather than U.S. sources.

Under this policy, the U.S. would continue to place emphasis on initiatives by regional actors to resolve

regional disputes through peaceful means. However it would still be possible for the U.S. to endorse/support Western or Arab military action in a crisis if such assistance were requested by a country. Every effort would be made to reduce Soviet or Eastern Bloc presence.

To borrow a few lines from Cyrus Vance "our best course is to help resolve the problems which create opportunities for external intervention...our policies must reflect our national values. Our deep belief in human rights - political, economic, and social...this means concern for individuals whose rights are threatened...and finally we will seek openness in our dealings..." [Ref. 122]

One of the basic flaws in this policy is the uncertainty of how one would deal with the Soviets or Eastern Bloc if arms deliveries are stepped up by them, or if additional advisors are provided in crisis situations, or if they increase their efforts to undermine Western presence and influence in the WIO.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

After attempting to delineate U.S. interests in the Western Indian Ocean from strategic, economic and political points of view the objectives and options available to the U.S. must be added to the equation. It has become quite apparent that the area of the Western IO played a minor role in U.S. strategic thinking in the past and that the United

States never considered itself a power in the area. This in part seems to stem from the fact that NATO allies were prominent in the area and there was no need to increase the U.S. presence. Since 1970 this feeling of the IO being secure and in "friendly" hands has been forced to give way in the face of European withdrawals and Soviet incursions.

The United States has a great deal of difficulty in deciding how to evaluate and react to Soviet activity in the area of the Western IO. There is continuing conflict among U.S. policy makers particularly between those who view Soviet activity in the light of East-West competition and others who view it within a broader context. The U.S. does not have interests in the Western IO that are so vital that their loss would seriously impact on the survival of the U.S.

It does not appear that the U.S. has a consistent policy toward the area either militarily, economically or politically. No longer can the U.S. rely on the Western European nations to carry the burden in the area and the U.S. must construct a comprehensive policy for the area. This policy must maximize U.S. strengths while minimizing the possibility of armed confrontation with the Soviets in the area.

While there is a valid case for seeking U.S. political, economic and military leverage in states which have perceived strategic importance to the U.S. and her western allies it should be a balanced approach rather than a lopsided one emphasizing only one facet. This approach should

not single out a specific country but rather must look at the area in a regional and global perspective. It is self-defeating to target an individual country in an area as the "most important" and then to watch that country succumb to either external or internal forces (i.e. Iran).

An Indian Ocean policy should be an affirmative rather than a reactive approach to the area and its problems. The downplaying of U.S.-Soviet competition and an increased emphasis on the importance of Third World economic development and nationalism should provide a viable form of interaction in the area. If an integrated approach is taken along these lines it will prove to be far more effective than one that is fragmented, random and lacking in coordination.

U.S. investment, trade and business enterprises in the area of the Western IO should be encouraged and sponsored by the U.S. government. The aim of these activities should not be exploitation of resources or the securing of strategic facilities but rather the development of an economic relationship between the U.S. and the countries of the region. The Eastern Bloc has demonstrated time and again that it cannot provide the sustained economic needs of its client states. The Eastern Bloc lacks the leverage of a large volume of overseas trade and investment. The Soviet Union allocates only minimal resources for economic aid and it does not appear to be consistent with its ideology to dispense financial aid to maintain governments in power. The Soviets have a

distinct advantage in wartime as they are willing to provide arms to liberation movements but in peacetime the West gains the upper hand as it has the technology and finances that are required to build countries.

U.S. economic aid to the countries of the Western IO should be on a scale comparable to that provided to other poor and less developed areas of the world. A number of countries in this area are among the poorest in the world. The assistance provided by Western allies and by the Arab nations of the world should be taken into account but they must not be the sole suppliers and the U.S. must supply a proportionate share and maintain an interest in the area.

Most Third World governments are socialistically inclined and/or have authoritarian regimes. Widespread poverty and the fragility of political systems coupled with anti-imperial and anti-colonial sentiments toward the West and its capitalistic system play right into the socialist's hands. The recent experiences with colonialism in the Western IO conditions many of the country's attitudes toward the U.S. The values and the culture of the West need to be re-emphasized in the area to counteract the appeal of socialist ideology. The rights and freedoms of the West need to be stressed as well as the prosperity of the U.S. along with its skills and expertise. The development of democratic political systems should not be the primary goal of U.S. policy nor should it be a prerequisite for aid. If the U.S.

refuses to aid countries because they are Marxist or socialist, what options do these countries have except to turn to the East? The very poverty and lack of bureaucratic structure in most countries works against the success of a socialist government unless massive external aid is readily available. It may very well be that the move to the left represents a throwing off of cultural and economic dependency on the West in the quest for national independence and Third World identity. [Ref. 123] We would do well to remember what an American official at the United Nations said when he cautioned, "that ideology is by no means the controlling factor in African politics...Tribal rivalries, economic development, nationalism are all more important than East-West ideology." [Ref. 124]

The key to U.S. policy will be the ability to work with political regimes of different persuasions in concerted diplomatic efforts to solve the regional problems of the area whether they be over territorial limits, disputed island claims or the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. The effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy will depend on how well the U.S. is able to deal with the various country players in the area irregardless of their political leaning ("moderate", "socialist" or "radical").

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